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INTRODUCTION
In the law of torts, two related disputes between lawyers and
economists require resolution. One dispute concerns the definition
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of due care-whereas economists contend that the reasonably pru-
dent person is justified in assuming that all other persons use due
care,1 lawyers posit that the reasonably prudent person knows or
should know that others act negligently in some circumstances.2 A
second dispute concerns whether the several negligence rules are
equally efficient-economists contend that the common-law de-
fense of contribut6ry negligence, which bars tort recovery from a
negligent defendant by a plaintiff who was also causally negligent,
is just as efficient as comparative negligence, in which losses are
shared according to relative fault;3 lawyers, however, assert that
I "A person cannot be deemed negligent for failing to take precautions against an acci-
dent that potential victims could avoid by the exercise of elementary care; negligence is
failing to take the care necessary and proper to prevent injury to reasonably careful per-
sons." Pomer v. Schoolman, 875 F.2d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.). "It is a bedrock
principle of negligence law that due care is that care which is optimal given that the poten-
tial victim is himself reasonably careful; a careless person cannot by his carelessness raise
the standard of care of those he encounters." McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554,
1557-58 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.). "[T]he law defines due care . . . as the care that is
optimal if the other party is exercising due care." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 155 (3d ed. 1986).
[A] rationally self-interested decisionmaker will assume that other potential par-
ties to an accident, victims or injurers, have chosen to take efficient precaution as
required by the legal standard of care and, that being so, it makes sense for the
rational decisionmaker also to take efficient precaution. We conclude that both
parties-potential victims and potential injurers-will take precaution at the effi-
cient level.
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 359-60 (1988).
I "We stress again the obvious truth of fact and law that it is not due care to depend
upon the exercise of care by another when such dependence is itself accompanied by obvious
danger." Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 281 N.W. 261, 262 (Minn. 1938) (citations omit-
ted). "[T]he ordinary reasonable person ... is required to realize that there will be a certain
amount of negligence in the world.... It is not due care to depend on the exercise of care by
another when such reliance is accompanied by obvious danger." Levi v. Southwest Louisiana
Elec. Membership Coop., 542 So.2d 1081, 1086 (La. 1989) (citations omitted). "[W]e do not
believe that the legal standard is set at the efficient level of precaution in all states." DAVID
W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS (unpublished,
1990), Teacher's Manual, ch. 3, at 9. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 302A
(1965) ("An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the negligent or reckless conduct
of the other or a third person."). "The plaintiff's contributory negligence may be . . . an
intentional and unreasonable exposure of himself to danger created by the defendant's neg-
ligence, of which danger the plaintiff knows or has reason to know . . . ." Id. § 466.
1 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 156. "Comparative negligence has the same effects on
safety as contributory negligence." Id.
[W]hen the legal standard is set at the efficient level of precaution, every one of
the negligence rules creates incentives for efficient precaution by potential victims
and potential injurers. The reason for this is that rationally self-interested deci-
sionmakers are led by considerations of self-interest to choose the legal standard
of care under any of the negligence rules.
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comparative negligence is the preferred legal standard.4
If the economic model of negligence is restated in the context
of a simple information theory, it is easy to demonstrate that the
lawyers' position in both disputes is, in general, correct. As in the
Watergate investigation, the key to both disputes is to ask, what
did the actors know and when did they know it? Two simple con-
cepts from game theory,5 which concern the state of a person's
knowledge and the temporal order of action, will be utilized as a
framework for an economic analysis of negligence. We ask whether
all persons and courts have certain knowledge of all relevant facts
and legal standards, that is, is there legal certainty or uncertainty,6
and whether all persons act simultaneously or sequentially. 7 Be-
cause each of. these two variables has two choices, four models re-
sult. Assuming legal certainty and simultaneous action by all per-
sons results in the standard economic model of negligence,s which
is presented in Section I. In the standard economic model of negli-
gence, all persons are justified in assuming that all other persons
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 357-58 (emphasis omitted); see also John P. Brown, To-
ward An Economic Theory Of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 343 (1973).
' "[W]e hope to address a misunderstanding of tort law by some law and economics
scholars and to reopen what apparently has become a closed question, that is, Is contribu-
tory negligence efficient? Our answer is a very lawyerly, 'It depends.'" BARNES & STOUT,
supra note 2, Teacher's Manual, ch. 3, at 9. "The hardship of the doctrine of contributory
negligence upon the plaintiff is readily apparent. It places upon one party the entire burden
of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis responsible .... As of 1982, some 40 states had
adopted some general form of comparative negligence." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 468-71 (5th ed. 1984). As of 1990, forty-four
states had adopted some form of comparative negligence. Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Com-
parative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REV.
199, 200 (1990). See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negli-
gence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978) (reassessing contributory and comparative
negligence and concluding that comparative negligence is best rule for economic and fair-
ness reasons).
I See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
(1989) (basic reference); see also MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES:
CONCEPTS AND SOLUTIONS (1987).
See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (defining legal certainty).
HAL VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONoMIcs: A MODERN APPROACH, ch. 27.7, at 474-
76 (1987); RASMUSEN, supra note 5, at 43-56.
8 Technically, the legal certainty and simultaneous action assumptions of the standard
economic model of negligence result in what economists call a "Nash" equilibrium. STEvEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 33 n.48 (1987). "In a Nash equilibrium the
players take their opponents' strategies as given and therefore do not consider the possibil-
ity of influencing them." JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 428-29
(1990). Formally, "a pair of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if A's choice is optimal, given
B's choice, and B's choice is optimal given A's choice." VARIAN, supra note 7, at 468 (empha-
sis omitted).
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use due care. In Section II, assuming legal certainty and sequential
action results in the last clear chance model, in which the second
mover knows that the first mover has not used due care; the first
mover has a significant advantage in this modelY Assuming uncer-
tainty and simultaneous action results in the "defensive driving" 10
or more generally the defensive care model, discussed in Section
III. In the defensive care model, a level of care higher than due
care is efficient when significant uncertainty exists as to which per-
son should take care and when the cost of accident prevention is
small. Finally, in Section IV, assuming uncertainty and sequential
action results in the "foreseeable misuse"1 or more generally the
foreseeable negligence model, in which the first mover reasonably
foresees that the second mover may not use due care; the first
mover has a significant disadvantage in this model. With the ex-
ception of the standard economic model, it is shown that compara-
tive negligence, which shares losses according to relative fault, is
more efficient than the contributory negligence defense, which op-
erates as a bar to tort recovery by negligent plaintiffs.
These models are not only relevant to negligence suits, they
also explain product liability suits based upon defective warning12
or defective product design 3 claims because these claims are de
9 VARIAN, supra note 7, ch. 27.7.
[T]he concept of Nash equilibrium is appropriate only when all decisions are
made simultaneously (once and for all); it is generally too weak when sequential
decisions are involved .... In games in which a player chooses some actions after
observing some of his opponents' actions ... this conjecture [that players take
their opponents' strategies as given and therefore do not consider the possibility
of influencing them] is naive and leads to some absurd Nash equilibria....
TIROLE, supra note 8, at 428-29 (emphasis added).
" William Vickrey, Automobile Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance: An
Economist's Critique, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 467 (1968).
"1 DeSantis v. Parker Feeders, Inc., 547 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1976); Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Decorative Precast Stone Erectors, Inc. v. Bucy-
rus-Erie Co., 493 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 642 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1981); Rivera v.
Westinghouse Elevator Co., 526 A.2d 705 (N.J. 1987); Soler v. Castmaster, 484 A.2d 1225
(N.J. 1984); Brown v. United States Stove Co., 484 A.2d 1234 (N.J. 1984); see also infra
notes 191, 192 and accompanying text.
12 The manufacturer's duty is to give a reasonable warning, not the best possible one.
Nolan v. Dillon, 276 A.2d 36 (Md. 1971); see also Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432
A.2d 925 (N.J. 1981); KEErON ET AL., supra note 4, § 99, at 697; Aaron D. Twerski et al., The
Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age,
61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976).
1" See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.); Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (Traynor, J.); see also James A.
Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices; The Limits
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facto negligence suits. 14 In Section V, it is shown that manufactur-
ers should be strictly liable for mismanufactured products, but
that in design defect and defective warning cases, courts should, in
general, be wary of extending liability much beyond a negligence
standard.
I. LEGAL CERTAINTY AND SIMULTANEOUS ACTION: STANDARD
ECONOMIC MODEL OF NEGLIGENCE
Major contributions to the standard economic model of negli-
gence were made by Judge Hand, 15 J.P. Brown, 6 Dean Calabresi, 17
and Judge Posner." The standard economic model of negligence
posits two key assumptions that figure prominently in its exposi-
of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); James A. Henderson, Jr., Design Defect
Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 541 (1976); James A. Henderson, Jr., The Bound-
ary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 MD. L. REV. 659 (1982) [hereinafter Henderson,
Enterprise Liability].
" See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984) ("Although many
courts have insisted that the risk-utility tests they are applying are not negligence tests
because their focus is on the product rather than the manufacturer's conduct, the distinc-
tion on closer examination appears to be nothing more than semantic.") (citation omitted);
see also Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (applying traditional risk-utility
balancing test in design defect case); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 99, at 698-700 (discuss-
ing consumer-contemplation and danger-utility tests used in design defect cases); Sheila L.
Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to
Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980) (analyzing risk-utility model).
"[W]hen liability turns on the adequacy of a warning, the issue is one of reasonable
care, regardless of whether the theory pled is negligence, implied warranty, or strict liability
in tort." Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Mich. 1979) (citations
omitted); see also Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 1969) (strict liabil-
ity turns on whether defendant "adequately warned of known or reasonably foreseeable idi-
osyncratic reactions"); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974) ("The
test therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the
risk involved.") (emphasis added).
It is commonly said that a product can be defective in the kind of way that makes
it unreasonably dangerous by failing to warn or failing adequately to warn about a
risk or hazard related to the way a product is designed. But notwithstanding what
a few courts have said, a claimant who seeks recovery on this basis must, accord-
ing to the generally accepted view, prove that the manufacturer-designer was
negligent.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 99, at 697.
5 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.).
'6 See Brown, supra note 3.
"7 Guido Calabresi & Von T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
'" See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); see also
Peter A. Diamond, Accident Law and Resource Allocation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCL
366 (1974); Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (1974). See
generally SHAVELL, supra note 8 (elegant presentation of standard economic model).
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tion and conclusions: First, every person knows the legal standard
of precaution and knows the costs of satisfying the legal standard,
both the costs incurred by her or himself and the costs incurred by
all other persons; moreover, the courts are always able to deter-
mine accurately whether any person has satisfied the legal stan-
dard.1 Neither persons nor courts ever make mistakes with such
calculations.2" This is the legal certainty assumption.21 Second, all
persons choose the levels of precaution they take at one point in
time; that is, if more than one person takes action, all of these per-
sons act simultaneously. This is the simultaneous action assump-
tion.22 Given these two key assumptions of the standard model, law
and economics scholars derive two controversial conclusions: (1) in-
dividuals have no duty to foresee or protect themselves from the
" Cooter and Ulen distinguish between conditions of certainty and conditions of evi-
dentiary uncertainty in which courts may make mistakes because they may incorrectly per-
ceive the true relationship between the injurer's level of precaution and the legal standard.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 400-01.
20 See Brown, supra note 3, at 323-24.
For our purposes the only function of the legal system is the impeccable adminis-
tration of whatever liability rule is in force. In order to concentrate on what is our
major concern, the parties' behavior, we ignore the distinction between judge and
jury, the problems of proof and burden of proof, the uncertainty of outcome, the
mistakes that the court can make, and the expense of operating the legal system.
Id. at 327.
2 Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 806 (1983)
[hereinafter Grady, Positive Theory]. "My critique of the conventional theory stems from
the examination of the effects of the assumption that injurers can always identify with per-
fect certainty the precaution level that courts will determine to be [efficient]." Id.; see also
Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 142-43 (1989) [hereinafter
Grady, Untaken Precautions]. In game theory, certain information is different from perfect
information. See TIROLE, supra note 8, at 429 ("Roughly, in ... games [of perfect informa-
tion] the player whose turn it is to play knows (has perfect information about) all the ac-
tions that have been chosen before this play. There is no element of simultaneity at all.").
Rasmusen makes technical distinctions among several categories of information; he gives
definitions of perfect, certain, symmetric, and complete information as well as common
knowledge. See RASMUSEN, supra note 5, at 51-54. For example, "[t]he strongest information
requirements are met by a game of perfect information, because in such a game each player
always knows exactly where he is in the game tree [like chess]. No moves are simultaneous,
and all players observe Nature's moves." Id. at 51. Information is certain if "Nature does
not move after any player moves." Id.
22 The standard economic model is an example of what economists call a "Nash equilib-
rium." See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 33 n.48. "[T]he concept of Nash equilibrium is appro-
priate only when all decisions are made simultaneously (once and for all); it is generally too
weak when sequential decisions are involved." TIROLE, supra note 8, at 428 (emphasis
added). The simultaneous action assumption is usually implicit rather than explicit in the
standard economic model. See PosNER, supra note 1, at 154; Brown, supra note 3, at 335
(using definition, but not name, of Nash equilibrium).
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negligent conduct of others;2" (2) the contributory negligence de-
fense, which bars tort recovery by a negligent plaintiff, is as effi-
cient as comparative negligence, in which losses are shared accord-
ing to relative fault. 4
Judge Posner expounds that standard model in terms of four
cases: unilateral care, alternative care in which plaintiff is the least
cost-avoider, alternative care in which defendant is the least cost-
avoider, and joint care in which the efficient solution requires that
both parties take care2 5 As will be shown, however, the legal cer-
tainty and simultaneous action assumptions make impossible the
existence of analytically significant differences among these cases
with respect to the issues of whether the reasonably prudent per-
son should foresee the negligence of others or whether the several
negligence standards are equally efficient.26 Only when these two
assumptions are, relaxed do analytically significant differences
occur.
A. Unilateral Care
The unilateral care case is illustrated by Blyth v. Proprietors
of Birmingham Waterworks Co.27 In Blyth, water damage occurred
when a connection between a fire plug and water main opposite
plaintiff's house burst. The apparatus had been installed and
maintained for twenty-five years without incident by the defend-
ant waterworks. The main pipe opposite plaintiff's house was bur-
ied more than the eighteen inches below the surface, as required
by statute.2 8 A severe frost caused a connection between a water
main and a pipe to spring a leak when frozen water expanded. The
issue was whether the defendant was negligent. The Court of Ex-
chequer held that even if defendant's precautions proved insuffi-
cient against the effects of the extreme severity of the frost of
1855, which penetrated to a greater depth than any which ordina-
rily occurs south of polar regions, defendant was not negligent be-
23 See supra note 1 (economists' position) and note 2 (lawyers' position).
24 See supra note 3 (economists' position) and note 4 (lawyers' position). The lawyers'
position also can be inferred from the fact that as of 1987, forty-four states had adopted
some form of comparative negligence. See Mutter, supra note 4, at 200 n.2.
" POSNER, supra note 1, at 154-56.
26 From the meta-view of game theory, the legal certainty and simultaneous action as-
sumptions guarantee that the four models are distinctions without a difference. See supra
notes 21-22.
27 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856).
" Id. at 1048.
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cause by providing for the average circumstances of temperature in
ordinary years, it had protected against such frosts as experience
would have led a prudent person to do. 29
The standard economic model of unilateral care explains
Blyth. Under conditions of legal certainty, the standard economic
model of negligence asserts that a person who fails to adopt the
level of precaution that will minimize social costs is negligent.3 0
Moreover, the criterion of social cost minimization is equivalent to
the famous Learned Hand test, B < PL, which courts use to deter-
mine whether a person is negligent.3 '
Two relevant social costs must be considered: the cost of dam-
age that results from accidents and the cost of preventing acci-
dents. In Figure 1 (p. 10), any point on the curve labeled Cost of
Accident Damage represents the marginal change in expected
monetary damage, '32 as measured on the vertical axis, when one ad-
ditional unit of care is taken to prevent accidents, as measured on
the horizontal axis. In terms of the Hand test, the Cost of Accident
Damage curve equals PL, the expected damage, which is the
probability of an accident occurring (P) multiplied (discounted) by
the loss from such accident (L). The Cost of Accident Damage
curve is downward sloping because additional precaution yields
29 The Court reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff homeowner, holding that
there was no evidence to leave to the jury. Id. at 1049.
30 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 349-50; SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 34; Brown,
supra note 3, at 340; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1970) ("I take it as axiomatic that the principal function of accident
law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.").
31 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.).
B represents the "burden of adequate precautions," P is the probability of an accident, and
L represents the loss from an accident. Id. at 173. For a further explanation of the Hand
formula, see POSNER, supra note 1, at 148-49; Brown, supra note 3, at 332. For a contempo-
rary application of the formula, see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slo-
bodna Plovidba, 583 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982).
32 Expected cost is what economists call the loss discounted by the probability of an
accident occurring. The term is formally defined as follows: Expected monetary value of all
possible outcomes is determined by taking each possible outcome, L, and multiplying it by
its respective probability, P, and summing the results; P1L1 + P 2L 2 +... PnLn, where n is
the nth or last possibility. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 55-56; see also EDWIN MANS-
FIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 571-72 (6th ed. 1988); A. MITCHELL PO-
LINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 51-56 (2d ed. 1989); VARIAN, supra note 7,
at 216, 219. The area under the Cost of Accident Damage curve, expected damage (which in
Figure 1 is represented by area ODNC), is a summation of every reasonably foreseeable
harm (L) multiplied by its respective probability (P). See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 33-34;
infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (discussing proximate cause).
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only diminishing returns;33 that is, increasing the level of precau-
tion initially prevents major accidents, then less serious accidents,
and so forth. The trapezoid-like area (ODNC) under the Cost of
Accident Damage curve represents the total expected damage from
all reasonably foreseeable accidents that will be avoided if level of
precaution C is taken. The area under the Cost of Accident Dam-
age curve between one precaution level and another, say from E to
M, represented by the trapezoid-like area EFGM, equals the total
decrease in expected accident damage that results from an increase
in precaution over that interval.
Sum of Social Costs (B + PL)/
minimum
social
X\
Cost of Accident Prevention (B)
Cost of Accident Damage (PL)
E M C
Precaution Level
of social costs in the standard economic model
of negligence3 4
Any point on the curve labeled Cost of Accident Prevention
represents the marginal change in cost of accident prevention, as
measured on the vertical axis, when one additional unit of precau-
tion is taken to avoid accidents, as measured on the horizontal
axis; in terms of the Learned Hand test, B < PL, this curve equals
B, the burden of increased precaution measured in dollar cost. The
" Brown, supra note 3, at 324; Grady, Positive Theory, supra note 21, at 801 n.10.
"' See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 364 fig.8.8; SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 35 fig.2.1.
Figure 1. Calculation
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Cost of Accident Prevention curve is upward sloping because it is
assumed that persons increase precaution by employing the least
expensive method of care first, the next least expensive method
second, and so forth. For example, a driver of an automobile can
increase the level of precaution, in order of ascending cost, by pay-
ing closer attention to the road, by driving more slowly, or by buy-
ing a heavier and more expensive automobile. The area under the
Cost of Accident Prevention curve from zero (0) care to a given
level of precaution, say M, represented by triangle-like area OSM,
equals the total cost of accident prevention up to that level of pre-
caution. The area under the Cost of Accident Prevention curve be-
tween one precaution level and another, say between Q and M,
represented by trapezoid-like area QASM, equals the increase in
the total cost of accident prevention that results from the increase
in precaution over that interval.
In terms of the Hand test, the efficient level of precaution is
that level at which the Cost of Accident Damage curve intersects
the Cost of Accident Prevention curve, level E in Figure 1 (where
B = PL). A level of precaution equal to M is inefficiently high
because the Cost of Accident Prevention (MS) exceeds the Cost of
Accident Damage (MG), that is, (B > PL); a level of precaution
equal to Q is inefficiently low because the Cost of Accident Preven-
tion (QA) is less than Cost of Accident Damage (QV), that is,
(B < PL).35 Another way of establishing that level E is the effi-
cient level of precaution is to look at the curve labeled Sum of
Social Costs; any point on this curve represents the sum of the
Cost of Accident Damage curve plus the Cost of Accident Preven-
tion curve. In terms of the Hand formula, this curve represents B
+ PL. The minimum point on the Sum of Social Costs curve rep-
resents the level of precaution at which minimum social costs is
achieved. The level of precaution that minimizes social costs is the
efficient level, E.36 In the unilateral care case, where there is only
one active party, the issues of whether individuals have a duty to
foresee or to protect themselves from the negligence of others and
whether the contributory negligence defense is as efficient .as the
loss-sharing comparative negligence standard are not relevant.3 7
Two important generalizations are implicit in the economic
" See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 37; Brown, supra note 3, at 343.
" See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 364 fig.8.8.
11 For a discussion of these issues, see infra notes 121-25, 130-31, 174-75, 200-02 and
accompanying text.
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model of negligence. First, it is not socially desirable to eliminate
all accidents because it would be too costly to do so.3 8 Put starkly,
not only are some deaths from accidents acceptable, it is efficient
that some accidental deaths occur. For example, although it is
probably desirable to reduce the annual death rate from automo-
bile accidents in the United States, which was approximately
47,000 fatalities in 1986,31 few individuals would agree to accept
the costs that would be necessary to eliminate all automobile fatal-
ities. Reducing the annual death rate from automobile accidents to
zero would require very low speed limits, long travel time, high
transportation costs for goods and persons, larger and heavier cars,
and high fuel costs. Most individuals probably would not be willing
to accept such costs in the sense that they would prefer to accept a
slightly increased risk of death from an automobile accident rather
than the greatly increased cost and inconvenience required for ab-
solute safety in transportation. 0 In terms of Figure 1 (p. 10), not
taking precaution to avoid the damage represented by trapezoid-
like area EFNC is efficient, since in order to eliminate such dam-
age, it would be necessary to spend an amount represented by
trapezoid-like area EFRC, a sum much larger than EFNC.
A second generalization is implicit in the standard model.
Even if a court were erroneously to hold a person to a standard of
care higher than the efficient level, E, a rational person would not
subsequently adopt a level of precaution greater than the efficient
level.4 ' Since the Cost of Accident Prevention curve is higher than
the Cost of Accident Damage curve at all levels of precaution
" See W. Kip Viscusi, Product and Occupational Liability, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP. 71, 89-90
(1991).
19 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 84 thl. 124 (1989) (46,867 motor vehicle
accident deaths reported in 1986).
4" Studies of the wage premiums demanded by workers in risky occupations indicate
that a trade-off exists between income and the acceptance of some risk of death. See infra
notes 216-17 (method of calculation and conclusions of these studies). Of course, this trade-
off is not linear; the amount of income that a person requires in order to accept a larger risk
rises much faster than the risk (exponentially). See MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP VISCUSI,
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT
LIABILITY (1990); POSNER, supra note 1, at 184-85; Rachel Dardis, The Value of Life: New
Evidence From the Marketplace, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 1077 (1980); Craig A. Olsen, An Analy-
sis of Wage Differentials Received by Workers on Dangerous Jobs, 16 J. HUM. RESOURCES
167 (1981).
"' See POSNER, supra note 1, at 160-61. This ignores the "insurance" and "activity"
effects consequent upon a shift from a negligence standard to one of strict liability. These
effects are discussed in Section V. See infra notes 224-51 and accompanying text (discussing
strict liability for mismanufactured products).
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greater than the efficient level, a rational person would not adopt a
level of precaution greater than the efficient level because paying
for any additional damage that occurs to the right of the efficient
level of precaution would be less expensive than paying for the cost
of taking precaution to prevent such damage. If held to a standard
of care greater than the efficient level, a rational person would cor-
rectly believe that she or he was being held strictly liable without
regard to fault, but, as indicated, would not take precaution be-
yond the efficient level.42
Let us now use the standard economic model to explain Blyth.
The Court of Exchequer held that the defendant acted as a reason-
ably prudent person by providing against such frosts as experience
would have led a such person to do.43 Applying the standard eco-
nomic model of negligence, the court found that the defendant wa-
terworks adopted the efficient level of care, level E in Figure 1 (p.
10). Providing for the effects of an unusual and extreme frost
would require a level of precaution greater than the efficient level
E. In order to achieve a level of precaution that would prevent
damage from a severe frost with a low probability of occurring,
much thicker pipes, water mains, and connections would be re-
quired, as well as the deeper entrenchment of water pipes; such a
level of precaution would be inefficient because the Cost of Acci-
dent Prevention curve exceeds the Cost of Accident Damage curve
everywhere to the right of E, the efficient level of precaution.
Moreover, as implied by the standard economic model of negli-
gence, even if the court had found the defendant waterworks lia-
ble, a rational defendant would not incur the cost of providing for
thicker pipes, nor would it bury the pipes deeper, to prevent dam-
412 This conclusion, which concerns the level of precaution, ignores the effect of strict
liability on the level of activity, which is discussed in Section V, infra notes 224-47 and
accompanying text. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (1980). The economic model of mismanufactured product liability, which is based on strict
liability principles, also is discussed in Section V, infra notes 224-47 and accompanying text.
4 The pipes were 18 inches underground, as required by statute. Blyth, 156 Eng. Rep.
at 1048. "While compliance with a statutory standard is evidence of due care, it is not con-
clusive on the issue. Such a standard is no more than a minimum, and it does not necessa-
rily preclude a finding that the actor was negligent in failing to take additional precautions."
KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 36, at 233; see also Christou v. Arlington Park-Washington
Park Race Tracks Corp., 432 N.E.2d 920 (Il. App. Ct. 1982) (industry customs are relevant
but not determinative of proper standard of care); Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 220
N.W.2d 137 (Mich. Ct. App.) (compliance with statutes and safety regulations not conclu-
sive on question of negligence), aff'd, 223 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. 1974), appeal after remand,
260 N.W.2d 131 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
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age from an extremely severe frost that occurs once in twenty-five
years; rather, it would realize that its least expensive course of ac-
tion would be to pay for the infrequent damage when it occurs.44
The waterworks would conclude that it was being held strictly lia-
ble without regard to fault.
B. Alternative Care
An alternative care accident is one in which damage could be
avoided if either of two persons takes care. In the context of the
standard economic model, it is not efficient for both parties to take
care; only the least cost-avoider should take care to prevent dam-
age.415 In this section, two cases involving alternative care are ana-
lyzed: one in which the plaintiff-victim is the least cost-avoider of
damage, the other in which the defendant-injurer is the least cost-
avoider.
1. Alternative Care Where Plaintiff Is the Least Cost-Avoider
Tennessee Trailways, Inc. v. Ervin46 illustrates a model in-
volving alternative care in which the plaintiff is the least cost-
avoider. In Ervin, a motorcyclist who "spurted" out from a private
road that intersected a highway was struck by the defendant's bus
and died.47 The Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the trial
court's directed verdict in favor of the defendant48 even though
there was evidence that the defendant's bus was being driven at
73.5 miles per hour, in violation of a state statute setting the speed
" In anticipation of the discussion in Section V, infra notes 224-47 and accompanying
text, a shift from negligence to strict liability would have an "insurance effect." Under a
negligence standard, homeowners would either have to buy insurance or accept the risk of
the cost-justified damage represented by area EFNC in Figure 1 (p. 10). A shift to strict
liability would mean that the waterworks would have to buy insurance or be a self-insurer
for the damage represented by area EFNC. Under negligence, homeowners would pay a
slightly lower water bill but would have a choice whether to buy insurance for the cost-
justified damage. Under strict liability, water bills would be slightly higher because home-
owners would be paying for water plus compulsory insurance. In terms of Section V's discus-
sion of the activity effect, a shift from a negligence standard to one of strict liability would
not change the quantity of water sold because water is a necessity; that is, water has a
greatly inelastic demand within the relevant price range. See infra notes 240-47 and accom-
panying text.
" ,'[Alternative care,' that is... the efficient solution... [is] for either party, but not
both, to take care." POSNER, supra note 1, at 155.
46 438 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1969).
4 Id. at 734-35.
48 Id. at 736.
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limit at 65 miles per hour.4"
Next, we consider an alternative care model in which the
plaintiff is the least cost-avoider in the context of legal certainty
and simultaneous action assumptions, and 'then apply the conclu-
sions from the model to Ervin. Assume that expected accident
damage is $1000 (PL), that -the plaintiff-victim, who is the least
cost-avoider, can avoid the damage by spending $50 (B), and that
the defendant-injurer, who is the high cost-avoider, must spend
$100 (B) to avoid the damage.5 0 In the context of the standard eco-
nomic model's assumption of legal certainty, both parties know
that plaintiff is the least cost-avoider, and that the plaintiff has a
duty to avoid the damage at a cost of $50. Given that the defend-
ant reasonably assumes the plaintiff will take care, that care by
both parties would be redundant and therefore inefficient, and that
both parties must choose whether to take care simultaneously, the
defendant will reasonably choose not to take care.' Thus, the two
key assumptions of legal certainty and simultaneous action cause
all persons to expect that all other persons will act in a reasonably
prudent manner.
Assume that for some reason, say because of negligence, the
plaintiff, who is the least cost-avoider, does not take care, and the
expected accident damage of $1000 occurs. The plaintiff-victim
sues the defendant, demanding compensation. Will the legal stan-
dard employed by courts create incentives for the avoidance of
damage in the future? Efficiency requires that the entire burden of
avoiding the damage rests on the plaintiff, who is the least cost-
avoider, so that in the future the plaintiff will realize that incurring
cost of accident prevention is less expensive than bearing cost of
accident damage. Because the plaintiff has breached a duty to take
care and is negligent, the plaintiff will be liable for the entire loss if
its conduct is evaluated by the contributory negligence defense; if
comparative negligence is applied, however, the plaintiff will also
bear the entire loss because the defendant has no duty of care and
is not negligent.52 In the context of this model, both standards
"9 Id. at 734.
0 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 154.
5 "The efficient solution is to make the plaintiff 'liable' by refusing to allow him to
recover damages from the defendant." Id.
51 A number of comparative negligence standards exist. Probably the simplest method
of allocating damages is what is commonly called "pure" comparative negligence. In this
form, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not operate to bar his recovery altogether,
but serves to reduce his damages in proportion to his fault. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
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yield identical results and therefore are equally efficient.
Let us interpret Ervin in terms of the standard economic
model. Ervin is an alternative care case because the accident could
have been avoided if either the motorcyclist or the bus driver had
taken care. The motorcyclist was the least cost-avoider; it is clearly
less expensive for a motorcyclist to take care before crossing a
highway on which traffic is speeding than it is for a bus to travel
slowly enough to stop in time to avoid colliding with vehicles cross-
ing the highway recklessly. In the context of the standard eco-
nomic model of negligence, defendant bus driver had no duty of
care with respect to the motorcyclist because the bus driver was
entitled to assume that the motorcyclist, as least cost-avoider,
would exercise due care.53 This strong conclusion, that in an alter-
native care case, the high cost-avoider has no duty of care, depends
upon the legal certainty and simultaneous action assumptions of
the standard model, which cause all persons to expect that all
other persons will act in a reasonably prudent manner.
532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). Several states have codified the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence. E.g., N.Y. CiV. PRAC. L. & R. 1411 (McKinney 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.22.005 (West 1988). The most common legislative approach for apportioning fault is the
modified, or "50%," system, under which a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar
recovery so long as it remains below a specified proportion of the total fault. KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 67, at 471-73. Two varieties of the 50% comparative negligence approach are
the 50% and the 51% standards. Under the "equal fault bar," or 50% approach, the plain-
tiff cannot recover anything if his fault is equal to or greater than that of the defendant; in
other words, the plaintiff is allowed to recover only if less negligent than the defendant. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111(1)-(3) (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Supp. 1990);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (West 1980). Under the "greater fault bar" system, or
51%, the plaintiff is prevented from recovering damages only if the plaintiff's fault exceeds
that of the defendant; the plaintiff is therefore allowed to recover if equal to or less negli-
gent than defendant. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.1 (West 1987). Under
both the 50% and 51% approaches, plaintiff's contributory negligence is a complete bar if
its fault exceeds the threshold. Juries tend to apportion fault equally in close cases, and the
plaintiff in such cases will recover half the loss under the 51% approach and nothing under
the 50% approach. See KEaTON Er AL., supra note 4, § 67, at 473. This result has led to
criticism of the 51% approach. See, e.g., Richard V. Campbell, Recent Developments of the
Law of Negligence in Wisconsin-Part II, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 4, 21; Robert E. Keeton, Com-
ment on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Leg-
islature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 906, 911 (1968).
53 It is clearly less expensive for the motorcyclist, who is on the verge of crossing a
highway, to take care to avoid a collision with vehicles traveling at high speed on a limited
access highway than it is for those vehicles to travel slowly enough to be able to stop in the
event that a vehicle recklessly enters the highway from an unlikely access point.
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2. Alternative Care Where Defendant Is the Least Cost-Avoider
Jackson v. Leach54 illustrates an alternative care case in which
the defendant is the least cost-avoider. Jackson involved an auto-
mobile accident at an intersection of two streets. The plaintiff's
vehicle, which was traveling north, collided with the defendant's
vehicle, which was traveling west. The plaintiff testified that when
he was within a distance of sixty feet from the intersection, travel-
ing at a speed between fifteen and twenty miles per hour, he had a
clear view to the west for a distance of 180 feet, and that there was
no vehicle in sight. The plaintiff thus argued that for the collision
to have occurred, the defendant's vehicle must have greatly ex-
ceeded the legal speed limit. The defendant alleged that the plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent because he failed to look to his
right when he reached the intersection; had he done so, he would
have seen the defendant's vehicle in time to have avoided the
collision."
The Maryland Court of Appeals, which upheld the jury verdict
for the plaintiff, held that the plaintiff was not required to look a
second time when he reached the intersection. 56 Although it was
incumbent upon the plaintiff to respect the rule giving the right of
way at street intersections to vehicles approaching from the right,
if, at the time he looked on approaching, and within a short dis-
tance of the intersection, the way for a safe distance was clear of
traffic coming from that direction, the plaintiff should not be judi-
cially declared negligent for not taking precautions against the pos-
sibility of a collision with a car that could not come into dangerous
proximity of his own unless it were unlawfully operated.
Next, we present an alternative care model in which the de-
fendant is the least cost-avoider, and then apply the conclusions
from the model to Jackson. Assume that expected accident dam-
age is still $1000 (PL) but that the costs of accident prevention are
reversed so that the plaintiff-victim is the high cost-avoider at
54 152 A. 813 (Md. 1931).
'5 Id. at 815.
Id. According to a trial judge experienced in collision cases,
In one collision case after another, I have found the factor that had conclusive
weight with the jury was the bare rule of right of way, unaffected by any and all
evidence of surrounding circumstances, untouched by the qualifications and limi-
tations that the judges have said should be imposed upon the application of the
rule.
JOSEPH N. ULMAN, A JUDGE TAKES A STAND 30 (1933).
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$100 (B), and the defendant-injurer is the least cost-avoider at $50
(B).
Assume that for some reason, say because of negligence, the
defendant, who is now the least cost-avoider, does not take care
and the $1000 damage occurs. The plaintiff-victim sues the defend-
ant, demanding compensation. Will the legal standard employed
by courts create incentives for the avoidance of damage in the fu-
ture? Efficiency requires that the entire burden to avoid the dam-
age rest on the defendant, who is the least cost-avoider, so that in
the future it will realize that incurring the cost of accident preven-
tion is less expensive than bearing the cost of accident damage. If,
however, the Hand test is applied to plaintiff and defendant indi-
vidually, without regard to the level of precaution that each party
can reasonably foresee that the other will take-that is, if the court
evaluates each party's level of precaution as if it were a unitary
care case-both plaintiff and defendant will be found negligent.57
The defendant, primarily negligent because it could have pre-
vented the $1000 damage if it had spent $50 (B($50) <
PL($1000)); the plaintiff, contributorily negligent because it could
have prevented the $1000 damage if it had spent $100 (B($100) <
PL($1000)). Thus, if each party's level of precaution is evaluated
independent of information concerning the level of precaution that
each party reasonably foresees the other will adopt, both will be
judged negligent, so the defendant will not bear the total loss
under any of the several negligence standards. As a result, the de-
fendant will have a reduced incentive to take care in the future.
How is this inefficient result to be avoided?
The two key assumptions of the standard economic model of
negligence dictate how a court will determine the appropriate fore-
sight of each of the parties. Where the defendant is the least cost-
avoider, the desired result is for the plaintiff to be found not negli-
gent under the Hand test, even when it does not take care. The
standard economic model's assumption of legal certainty means
that the courts and both parties know that the efficient result is for
the defendant to spend $50 to avoid the damage and for the plain-
tiff to take no precaution. The simultaneous action assumption
means that both plaintiff and defendant must choose whether or
not to take care at the same time. A reasonably prudent plaintiff
" Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1057-58 (1972).
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will not take care because it will assume (foresee) that the defend-
ant will take care and will thus foresee accident damage of zero.
Given legal certainty and simultaneous action, the appropriate
value for expected accident damage that is to be used in the Hand
formula as applied to the plaintiff is zero; therefore, the plaintiff is
not negligent, B($100) > PL($0).5 8 Since the defendant is negli-
gent and plaintiff is not negligent, the several negligence standards
yield identical results and are therefore equally efficient.
In the context of the standard economic model of negligence, a
reasonably prudent person is always justified in expecting other
persons to act in a reasonably prudent manner. As Judge Posner
expressed it, due care is "the care that is optimal if the other party
is exercising due care." 9 As will be shown below, once the standard
model's key assumptions of legal certainty and simultaneous action
are relaxed, Posner's definition of due care, with its implicit as-
sumption that the reasonably prudent person never has a duty to
foresee the negligent conduct of others, is false.
Applying the model to Jackson, the speeding defendant
clearly was the least cost-avoider in terms of all relevant social
costs that speeders inflict on others; much less social cost is in-
curred if one speeder slows down than if all other drivers must
take extra care to avoid the speeder.6 0 In terms of the standard
economic model, Jackson is an alternative care case, in which the
plaintiff was entitled to assume that all other persons use due care
and so was not required to look a second time upon reaching the
intersection; plaintiff was not contributorily negligent because he
had no duty of care. In the context of Section III's defensive care
model, however, it will be shown that Jackson would be reversed
because the plaintiff would have a duty to look a second time upon
reaching the intersection.
8 POSNER, supra note 1, at 155.
" Id. Posner's definition of due care is a "Nash equilibrium" definition. See supra
notes 8-9. As pointed out in those notes, the Nash equilibrium concept is appropriate only
when all parties act simultaneously.
11 It is clearly less expensive for the defendant to reduce speed than it is for all drivers
with whom he comes in close proximity to alter their behavior to accommodate the speeder.
Technically, speeders, like the defendant, impose external costs on ,not just the plaintiff but
on all other drivers. An externality is "a cost that the voluntary actions of one person im-
pose on others without their consent." COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 343; see also MANS-
FIELD, supra note 32, at 484 ("An external diseconomy occurs when an action taken by an
economic unit results in uncompensated costs to others .... "); John Cirace, An Economic
Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 Tsx. L. REv. 481, 493-94
(1982) (externality exists when activity of A imposes cost on B for which A is not charged).
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C. Joint Care
LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. 6 1 illus-
trates the joint care case in which both parties must adopt a coop-
erative level of care if the least cost solution is to be achieved. In
LeRoy Fibre, the plaintiff-manufacturer stored flax straw on a
tract of ground located between its factory and the railroad tracks.
The flax was arranged in three-ton stacks in two rows parallel with
the railroad. The distance from the railroad tracks to the first row
of stacks of flax was about seventy-five feet; the second row was
about eighty-five feet from the tracks. When large quantities of
sparks and live cinders were emitted from the defendant's locomo-
tive, one of the stacks in the second row ignited, as a result of
which all of the stacks were consumed. 2 Despite substantial evi-
dence that the locomotive was operated negligently, defendant
contended that plaintiff was contributorily negligent because of the
flammable character of the flax and its proximity to the railroad.6 3
Speaking for the United States Supreme Court, Justice McKenna
held that "[t]he doctrine of contributory negligence is entirely out
of place. Depart from the simple requirement of the law, that every
one must use his property so as not to injure others, and you pass
to refinements and confusing considerations."6 Justice Holmes,
concurring in part, was not prepared to decide the issue of contrib-
utory negligence because the jury should decide "whether the
plaintiff's flax was so near to the track as to be in danger from
even a prudently managed engine."6' 5
The Court's decision in LeRoy Fibre can be analyzed through
conclusion derived from a model of joint care in which efficiency
requires that both persons take care (Table 1). Assume that the
expected accident damage (PL) is $1000. Such damage can be
avoided in any of three ways: (1) alternative care in which only the
01 232 U.S. 340 (1914).
82 Id. at 342.
es Id. at 342-43.
6 Id. at 350 (McKenna, J.). Justice McKenna clarified that the property surrounding
the railroad may be subject to risks and may suffer inconvenience from the legitimate opera-
tion of the railroad, but distinguished this permissible risk and interference from risk due to
the wrongful operation of the railroad, which is impermissible. Id. This idea resembles t-
day's recognized cause of action in private nuisance. See KEaTON ET AL., supra note 4, § 87,
at 619-26. To recover on a private nuisance theory, the plaintiff must show that the defend-
ant intentionally, substantially, and unreasonably interfered with plaintiff's use and enjoy-
ment of land. Id. at 620-23.
" LeRoy Fibre, 232 U.S. at 353 (Holmes, J., concurring in part).
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railroad takes care, avoiding damage by installing a super spark
arrester that prevents all sparks from escaping but so constricts
the engine's smoke stack opening as to increase the total cost of
operating the engine by $110; (2) alternative care in which only the
LeRoy Fibre Company takes care, avoiding damage by keeping its
flax stacks at least 200 feet from the railroad tracks at a cost of
$100, which it incurs because flax cannot be stored on a large por-
tion of its property;66 or, (3) joint care, in which damage is avoided
by having the Leroy Fibre Company keep its flax stacks at least
100 feet from the railroad tracks at a cost of $50 and by having the
railroad install a regular spark arrester that is not as effective as
the super model but is less expensive to operate at $25 because it
does not constrict the smoke stack as much as the super spark
arrester.
Table 1. Model of Joint Care Where Efficiency Requires Both Par-
ties to Take Care67
(1) (2) (3)
Super Spark Regular Spark No Spark
Arrester (0 ft.) Arrester (100 ft.) Arrester (200 ft.)
Cost of Accident
Prevention to RR $110 $25 $ 0
Cost of Accident
Prevention to Fibre Co. $ 0 $50 $100
Total Cost of
Accident Prevention $110 $75 $100
These figures may be changed so that one or the other alternative care solutions
becomes the least cost solution; e.g., if in column 3, $100 was $70, alternative care
by the LeRoy Fibre Company would be the least cost solution; if in column 1,
$110 was $60, alternative care by the railroad would be the least cost solution. 8
Adapted, with permission, from Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
(3d ed. 1986).
( Cf. Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry., 3 H. and N. 743 (Ex. 1858) and 5 H. and N. 679 (Ex.
1860), cited by R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 30-31 (1960) (no
liability for fires caused by sparks because railway had statutory authority to run steam
engines).
67 POSNER, supra note 1, at 155 tbl. 6.1.
as RICHARD POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND EcONoMIc ANALYsIs 328 (1982).
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It is easy to see from Table 1 that the least cost of $75 is
achieved when the railroad installs a regular spark arrester at a
cost of $25 and the LeRoy Fibre Company keeps its flax stacks 100
feet from the railroad tracks at a cost of $50, for a total social cost
of $75. Assume that for some reason, say because of negligence,
either the railroad or the LeRoy Fibre Company does not take the
efficient level of precaution dictated by column 2 of Table 1, so
that the expected damage of $1000 occurs. To be specific, assume
that the LeRoy Fibre Company keeps its flax stacks at least 100
feet from the railroad tracks but that the railroad does not install a
spark arrester.
As in the models above, we ask whether the legal standards
employed by courts create efficient incentives for the avoidance of
damage in the future? Efficiency requires that both the railroad
and the LeRoy Fibre Company take the appropriate level of pre-
caution, not just the LeRoy Fibre Company.69 For the same rea-
sons as in the alternative care cases discussed above, if the Hand
test is applied to the railroad and LeRoy Fibre Company individu-
ally, without regard to the level of precaution that one party can
reasonably foresee that the other will take, that is, if the court
evaluates each party's level of precaution as it would in a unitary
care case, both will be found negligent.70
If the standard economic model is employed, however, only
the railroad will be found negligent. The model assumes that all
parties know each other's costs and that the efficient legal stan-
dard is certain and known to all; therefore, both the railroad and
69 See John Cirace, A Synthesis of Law and Economics, 44 Sw. L.J. 1139, 1167-86
(1990) (joint care economic analysis of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870
(N.Y. 1970), calling for most economically efficient coordination of parties' conduct in deter-
mining remedy). "[E]fficient coordination of the activities balances the detrimental effect of
each activity on the other by minimizing such effects in the cheapest manner... [resulting]
in a combined income from the two activities that is greater than the combined income from
uncoordinated activities .... Id. at 1179. Some theorists believe that efficient coordination
results naturally from perfect competition, in which the parties themselves recognize the
benefits of cooperation and are best able to distribute risk efficiently. See Coase, supra note
66, at 1. Those theorists embracing less optimistic views of the competitive process recognize
no reason why rational self-interested parties should agree about how to divide the stakes,
thus posing an insurmountable obstacle to the creation of noncompetitive bargains absent a
rule for dividing the surplus. See Robert Cooler, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17
(1982).
7' Because the railroad could have prevented the $1000 harm had it spent $25, it is
negligent (B($25) < PL($1000)); similarly, because the LeRoy Fibre Company could have
prevented the $1000 had it spent $100 rather than $50, it is negligent as well (B($100) <
PL($1000)).
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the LeRoy Fibre Company know the information contained in Ta-
ble 1 and know that their choice of care will be evaluated by refer-
ence to it. Since the standard model also employs the simultaneous
action assumption, which means that both the railroad and LeRoy
Fibre Company have to choose their levels of precaution before
each knows what level of precaution the other will choose, it is rea-
sonable for each to foresee that the other will choose the efficient
or least cost care level shown in the second column of Table 1; the
LeRoy Fibre Company can reasonably assume that the railroad
will install a regular spark arrester, and the railroad can reasonably
assume that the LeRoy Fibre Company will keep its flax stacks 100
feet from the tracks. Thus, because LeRoy Fibre Company's care
level is consistent with expectations of a reasonably prudent per-
son, whereas the railroad's care level is not,7 1 a court will deter-
mine that the railroad is negligent for not installing a regular spark
arrester and that the LeRoy Fibre Company is not negligent if it
keeps its flax stacks 100 feet from the railroad tracks. 2 Moreover
the conclusion dictated by the legal certainty and simultaneous ac-
tion assumptions-that only the railroad is negligent-means that
the several negligence standards yield identical results and are
therefore equally efficient.
Justice McKenna's opinion in LeRoy Fibre, that the railroad
must use its property so as not to injure others under any circum-
stances, is not consistent with the efficient solution. In terms of
Table 1, the opinion of Justice McKenna would endorse the first
column, which is not the least cost solution because it would re-
quire the railroad to install a super spark arrester if the LeRoy
Fibre Company put its flax stacks next to the railroad tracks. Jus-
tice Holmes's concurring opinion, that the jury should decide
whether the plaintiff's flax was so near to the track as to be in
danger from even a prudently managed engine, is consistent with
the cost-efficient joint care solution depicted in the second column.
In conclusion, the legal certainty and simultaneous action as-
71 Cf. McKain v. Haynes, 203 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). The plaintiff's filling
station was destroyed by a fire that spread from the adjoining lot where defendants were
negligently burning trash. The jury found that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in fail-
ing to cut the dry grass that surrounded the wooden buildings of the filling station, which
were saturated with gasoline and oil. Id. at 970.
72 The LeRoy Fibre Company's level of precaution is consistent with expectations of a
reasonably prudent person. The reasonably prudent person reasonably expects PL = 0 be-
cause it assumes that the railroad will act as a reasonably prudent person and therefore
install a regular spark arrester.
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sumptions of the standard economic model dictate that in all four
cases discussed above (unilateral care, two alternative care cases,
and joint care), the reasonably prudent person always assumes
others will use due care. Moreover, the contributory negligence de-
fense, which bars recovery by a plaintiff who was negligent, is as
efficient as comparative negligence, which apportions liability ac-
cording to relative fault.
D. Legal Certainty and Principles of Causation
This section will discuss the relevance of the legal certainty
assumption made in the standard economic model with regard to
the two elements of causation in negligence: cause-in-fact and
proximate cause. Major contributions to the theory of causation in
economic models were made by Mark Grady s and Dean Cala-
bresi.74 Ervin,75 the motorcycle-bus collision case, illustrates these
principles. The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Ervin could have
upheld the trial court's directed verdict for the defendant bus com-
pany in any of at least three doctrinal ways. The court could have
employed the standard economic model of negligence and held
that the defendant bus company was entitled to assume that the
motorcyclist, as least cost-avoider, would exercise due care in this
alternative care situation; therefore, defendant was not negligent
because it had no duty to take care. As previously shown, this bold
conclusion, that the high cost-avoider has no duty of care in an
alternative care situation, is derived from the legal certainty and
simultaneous action assumptions of the standard economic model,
which allow all parties to assume that all other persons will act in a
reasonably prudent manner. Second, the court could have held
that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was a complete bar to
compensation regardless of whether the defendant was negligent."6
11 See Grady, Positive Theory, supra note 21; Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra
note 21.
" See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalvan, Jr., 43 U. CM. L. REv. 69 (1975); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); Steven
Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980). But see Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic
Linkage; The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985) (critique of eco-
nomic analysts' views on causation in tort law).
" See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing Ervin).
76 Tennessee is one of the remaining six states that have retained the contributory neg-
ligence defense, which bars recovery by a plaintiff who was causally negligent. See Arnold v.
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Finally, as the court actually held, even if the defendant was driv-
ing negligently by exceeding a speed limit set by state statute,"
the speed of the bus was not an immediate cause of the accident.78
Let us use the standard economic model of negligence as depicted
in Figure 1 (p. 10) to explain Ervin in terms of the concepts of
negligence, cause-in-fact, and proximate cause when all parties and
courts are assumed to have certain knowledge of all relevant facts
and legal standards.
1. Negligence
A negligence suit comprises two basic elements: (1) a breach of
a duty to use due care and (2) causation. 9 In terms of Figure 1, a
party is negligent when it adopts a level of precaution less than the
efficient level, E. In Ervin, both the motorcyclist and bus driver
used less than due care. By "spurting out" onto a high speed high-
way from a private road, the motorcyclist was negligent in choosing
a level of precaution less than E in Figure 1 (p. 10). Since the legis-
latively mandated speed limit is at least presumptively the maxi-
mum speed at which one can travel and still use due care, the evi-
dence that the defendant's bus was being driven in excess of that
speed limit makes a strong case that defendant's level of precau-
Hayslett, 655 S.W.2d 941 (Tenn. 1983); KEErON ET AL., supra note 4, § 65, at 451-53; Mut-
ter, supra note 4, at 201.
77 Standards of conduct may be set by legislative enactment, from which it is negligent
to deviate. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285-286 (1979). A probable majority of
courts would hold that the breach of a duty established by applicable statute conclusively
would determine the negligence of the breaching party absent sufficient excuse. KETON FT
AL., supra note 4, § 36, at 229-30; see also Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920)
(Cardozo, J.) (unexcused violation of statute is negligence). Nevertheless, many courts have
held that statutory violations may be only prima facie evidence of negligence, which may be
accepted or rejected upon the weighing of all evidence presented. KEETON ET AL., supra note
4, § 36, at 230.
78 Ervin, 438 S.W.2d at 735..
7 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 30, at 164. Defining the scope of an elusive term
such as "duty" has proved to be difficult. See generally Leon Green, The Duty Problem in
Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928). One argument defines duty, and thus
negligence, as a matter of relation between the parties, which must be founded upon the
foreseeability of harm to the person in fact injured. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162
N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Others champion the idea that everyone owes a duty to the world at
large, regardless of whether the victim in fact injured was reasonably expected to suffer
injury as a result of the conduct at issue. See id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting). But "[n]o
better statement can be made than that the court will find a duty where, in general, reason-
able persons would recognize it and agree that it exists." KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 54,
at 359.
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tion was less than E in Figure 1 (p. 10).80
2. Cause-In-Fact
The second basic element that a plaintiff has the burden of
proving in a negligence suit is that defendant's negligence was the
legal cause of plaintiff's damage."' Courts often employ but-for, or
sine qua non, causation to determine whether the cause-in-fact el-
ement of the legal causation requirement has been satisfied.82 To
determine whether the but-for causation requirement is satisfied,
courts ask whether the accident that occurred would have been
prevented if the party in question had exercised due care. If the
answer to this counter-factual inquiry is affirmative, a court will
hold that the party's negligence is a cause-in-fact of the accident;83
if the accident would not have been prevented even if due care had
been exercised, a party's negligence is not a cause-in-fact of the
accident. Let us translate this inquiry into the standard economic
model as represented in Figure 1.
The area under the Cost of Accident Damage curve, triangular
area ODC, includes every reasonably foreseeable damage (L)8 4
80 Ervin, 438 S.W.2d at 733-34; see also supra note 77.
81 Legal cause includes both cause-in-fact and proximate cause determinations. KEETON
ET AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 265; see also H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONOR9, CAUSATION IN THE
LAW chs. V-VI (2d ed. 1959); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60
MICH. L. REv. 543, 548-49 (1962) (cause-in-fact inquiry "limited to the fact of the defend-
ant's contribution to the injury," whereas proximate cause -requires determination of
"whether the defendant's conduct should be condemned and he be made to compensate for
his victim's injury").
81 See Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 21, at 147.
The most common test of cause in fact is whether the harm would have occurred
but for the defendant's failure to have taken the untaken precaution that consti-
tuted the breach of duty. In other words, viewed ex post, would the untaken pre-
caution have prevented the accident? Indeed, in all situations except concurrent
sufficient causation (for example, two converging negligently started fires),
whether the untaken precaution would have prevented this harm is the test of
cause in fact. Where the precaution identified would not have prevented the harm,
the plaintiff can never recover.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 265-69; Wex S. Ma-
lone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956).
83 See infra text accompanying notes 99-104 (discussing Butterfield v. Forrester).
84 See Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner,
J.).
For in determining the benefits of a precaution-and PL, the expected accident
costs that the precaution would avert, is a measure of the benefits of the precau-
tion-the trier of fact must consider not only the expected cost of this accident
but also the expected cost of any other, similar accidents that the precaution
would have prevented.
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multiplied by its respective probability (P).8 5 In terms of Figure 1
(p. 10), but-for causation is depicted by the area under the Cost of
Accident Damage curve to the left of the efficient level of care, E
(trapezoid-like area ODFE), which includes all damage that would
have been prevented had the party used due care. In terms of but-
for causation, the specific PL combination that occurred must be
within area ODFE. But-for causation excludes the expected dam-
age in trapezoid-like area EFNC to the right of the efficient level
E, which depicts damage that would not be prevented even if a
person used due care."' The high cost of preventing such damage is
indicated by that portion of the Cost of Accident Prevention curve
above trapezoid-like area EFNC.57
With respect to the motorcyclist, the type of damage that oc-
curred would not have occurred but-for his negligence. In other
words, the damage that occurred because of the negligence of the
motorcyclist was in trapezoidal area ODFE. With respect to the
defendant's negligence, the PL combination, which represents the
risk of death of the motorcyclist, is not within trapezoid ODFE.
The motorcyclist's death could not have been prevented even if the
bus driver had respected the 65 mile per hour speed limit because
the bus driver, at that speed, would still not have been able to stop
in time to avoid hitting the motorcyclist who darted out onto the
highway. The only way a bus could stop quickly enough in this
situation would be to drive at an extremely slow speed, probably
Id.; see also infra note 150.
8' See Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 21, at 146 ("The orthodox economic
theory assumes that a precaution is required or not, based on its potential to reduce the
type of accident that actually occurred. Nothing could be farther from the truth."). In re
Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., 3 K.B. 560 (C.A. 1921) is a well-known case that Grady
cites as being contrary to the orthodox theory. In Polemis, the defendants negligently
dropped a heavy plank into the hold of a ship in which petrol was stowed. A spark caused
an explosion, which destroyed the ship. The defendants were held liable even though it is
not reasonably foreseeable that dropping a plank would cause an explosion. That is, eco-
nomic theory assumes PiLl, not, PiLe, where i is not equal to e, as in the Polemis case. Grady
cites Polemis as an example of judicial recognition of what he calls the "risk-adding princi-
pie." Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 21, at 146. Under this principle, which is
ignored by orthodox economic theory, courts add risks that were not foreseeable to their
determination of whether an untaken precaution was negligent. Id. Economic theory, which
determines the required precaution based on its ability to reduce the probability of the type
of accident that actually occurred, fails to account for the practice of adding unforeseeable
risks by the courts.
:6 See Grady, Positive Theory, supra note 21, at 803-06.
7' To prevent the damage represented by area EFNC, it would be necessary to spend
the much larger amount represented by area EFRC.
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30 miles per hour or less. Such slow travel would be extremely
costly to the bus company in terms of lost revenue from passen-
gers. With respect to the operation of defendant's bus, the PL
combination that occurred is within trapezoid-like area EFNC and
therefore does not pass the but-for test. Thus, the bus driver's neg-
ligence was not a cause-in-fact of the accident.
3. Proximate Cause
The Cost of Accident Damage curve is the upper bound of all
reasonably foreseeable damage. 8 The position and height of any
individual's Cost of Accident Damage curve depends upon the in-
formation courts consider in determining the reasonable foresight
that is used to bound expected damage.8" Since the standard eco-
nomic model's legal certainty and simultaneous action assumptions
allow individuals to assume that other persons always use reasona-
ble care, this model results in the lowest conceivable Cost of Acci-
dent Damage curve and correspondingly the most restrictive no-
tion of proximate cause. However, as will be shown, once the legal
certainty and simultaneous action assumptions are relaxed, a rea-
88 Some damages that pass the but-for test of causation are ruled out of foreseeable
expected damage (PL) on public policy grounds; that is, but-for causation is necessary but
not sufficient for legal causation. For example, a train breaks down (as a result of the rail-
road's negligence), and a passenger staying in a hotel is injured when the hotel burns down.
But for the train's breaking down, the passenger would have slept in a different hotel that
did not burn down that night. Negligence and causation exist, but no liability. The economic
reason is that the risk of a hotel fire is not a part of PL, the expected accident damage that
the railroad could have prevented by taking precautions at a cost of B. The risk of damage
by hotel fire is probably too remote from the railroad's negligence even to be included
within the "risk-adding principle" applied by courts according to the critics of economic
theories of causation. See supra note 85. Another group of cases involving economic damage
is also discussed under the rubric of cause in law, even though they seem to rest on the same
policy considerations as the first group. See infra note 89.
8 In Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1945), the defendant's negligence put
the only bridge between an island and the mainland out of commission. Merchants on the
island who saw their business dry up as a result of the collision sued the defendant but lost;
there was causation but no liability. Most of the loss experienced by the island merchants
was offset by gains to mainland merchants, so the only social cost was the loss of the bridge.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 168-69. In In re Kinsman Transit Co. ("Kinsman No. 2"), 388 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968) a shipper who was put to considerable added expense for extra transpor-
tation and storage costs due to defendant's negligence in destroying a bridge was not al-
lowed to recover damages because the connection was too remote to permit recovery. Id.; see
also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) (causation existed
but no liability due to unforeseeable plaintiff); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts
Dock & Eng'g Co. ("Wagon Mound No. 1"), P.C. 1961 App. Cas. 388 (causation, but no
liability because of unforeseeable harm).
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sonably prudent person knows or should know that other persons
may be negligent, and such knowledge must be considered when
determining the reasonable foresight a party will be deemed to
have; this consequently affects the reasonable level of care. If
courts assume that a reasonably prudent person has a duty to fore-
see negligent acts of others, the position of the Cost of Accident
Damage curve will be higher than if courts assume that a reasona-
bly prudent person foresees that all persons act with due careY0 As
the Cost of Accident Damage curve in Figure 1 (p. 10) shifts up-
ward, it will intersect the Cost of Accident Prevention curve far-
ther to the right, implying that due care requires a higher level of
precaution.
II. LEGAL CERTAINTY AND SEQUENTIAL ACTION: LAST CLEAR
CHANCE MODEL
In this section, we retain the standard model's legal certainty
assumption but alter the simultaneous action assumption so that
the model now assumes legal certainty and sequential action. Con-
tributors to the economic model of negligence under sequential de-
cision making are Thomas Schelling,9 ' Steven Shavell,92 and Don-
ald Whitman. 3 When legal certainty and action regarding the level
of precaution are taken sequentially, the person who acts first has
90 The Cost of Accident Damage curve is plotted on the basis of some amount of infor-
mation, the possession of which determines the extent of harm to be expected by use of
reasonable foresight.
This level of information is assumed to be given (or exogenous) when the ... [Cost
of Accident Damage] curve is drawn. The amount of information that courts use
in estimating expected harm is "reasonable foresight." The ... [Cost of Accident
Damage] curve is thus assumed to be drawn on reasonable foresight.... The area
superscribed by the ... [Cost of Accident Damage] curve can be called the "rea-
sonably foreseeable risk.
Grady, Positive Theory, supra note 21, at 802 n.1. The area superscribed by the Cost of
Accident Damage curve can thus be called the "reasonably foreseeable risk." Id. Although
each individual's Cost of Accident Damage curve is "a function of the precaution taken by
the other individuals," this interdependency is irrelevant under the standard economic
model's assumptions of legal certainty and simultaneous action. See id. at 805 n.24.
91 THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 24, 32, 37 (1980).
92 Steven Shavell, Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially, 26 J.L. &
EcoN. 589 (1933).
11 Donald Whitman, Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitiga-
tion of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1981). Much of
the writing on the economic model of negligence under sequential decision making has a
schizophrenic character because the authors are attempting to discuss sequential issues in
models employing Nash equilibrium concepts that are valid only when parties make deci-
sions simultaneously. See supra notes 8-9.
1992]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
a significant advantage over the person who acts second. In negli-
gence law, the second mover's disadvantage is enshrined in the last
clear chance doctrine. The existence of the last clear chance doc-
trine was an anomaly in the contributory negligence era, and its
disappearance in the comparative negligence era is strong evidence
that the contributory negligence defense is not as efficient as com-
parative negligence in cases involving sequential action.9 4
We begin by considering two alternative care cases involving
sequential decisions: Butterfield v. Forrester,95 which most schol-
ars agree established the contributory negligence defense in 1809;96
and Davies v. Mann,97 which established the last clear chance ex-
ception to the contributory negligence defense in 1842.98 Next, the
economic model that assumes legal certainty and sequential action
is discussed and applied to the two cases and a joint care case.
A. Alternative Care and Sequential Decisions
In Butterfield, the defendant, while repairing his house, which
was close by the road side, put up a pole across part of the road,
leaving some free passage in the same direction.99 The plaintiff left
a public house at eight in the evening while it was still light
enough to discern the obstruction. 00 He rode "as fast as his horse
could go," did not observe the obstruction, rode into it, fell with
his horse, and was injured. 10' The jury verdict for the defendant
was affirmed on appeal.0 2 Judge Bayley asserted that the plaintiff
was the cause-in-fact of the accident: "[T]he accident appeared to
" Last clear chance has been called a transitional doctrine, "a way station on the road
to apportionment of damages." KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 66, at 464; see also Fleming
James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 722 (1938) (calling
for statutory adoption of proportional fault). Last clear chance is to contributory negligence
as epicycles are to the Ptolemaic system. At least forty-four states have shifted from evalu-
ating plaintiff's conduct by the all-or-none contributory negligence standard to some form of
comparative negligence. See Mutter, supra note 4, at 200.
103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
98 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 65, at 451 n.1.
9 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842).
" KEETON Er AL., supra note 4, § 66, at 462-63.
8 103 Eng. Rep. at 926.
100 Id. at 926-27.
... Id. at 927.
102 Id. The report states that there was no evidence of plaintiff being intoxicated at the
time. Id. Given that the plaintiff had just left a public house at closing time and was riding
his horse "violently," id., it is hard to believe plaintiff was not intoxicated.
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happen entirely from his own fault."'1 3. Lord Ellenborough's opin-
ion contains the classic definition of the contributory negligence
defense, which bars recovery by a plaintiff who was negligent:
"Two things must concur to support this action, an obstruction in
the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary
care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.' 10 4
In Davies, the plaintiff fettered the forefeet of an ass belong-
ing to him and turned it onto a public highway to graze off the side
of the road. 0 5 Defendant's wagon, drawn by a team of three hor-
ses, came down a slight descent at a "smartish pace," struck and
ran over the ass, killing it. 0 6 The jury verdict for the plaintiff was
affirmed on appeal.10 7 Notwithstanding Lord Ellenborough's hold-
ing in Butterfield that the plaintiff must be free from negligence,108
Baron Parke's opinion established the last clear chance exception
to the contributory negligence defense:
although the ass may have been wrongfully there, still the defend-
ant was bound to go along the road at such a pace as would be
likely to prevent mischief. Were this not so, a man might justify
the driving over goods left on a public highway, or even over a
man lying asleep there, or the purposely running against a car-
riage going on the wrong side of the road.10
Thus, as Baron Parke's opinion makes clear, the second mover is
at a disadvantage in a last clear chance situation because a reason-
ably prudent person, who knows or should know of the first
mover's negligence, has a duty to avoid the harm."0
103 Id. (Bayley, J.). See supra notes 81-87 (discussing cause in fact).
104 Butterfield, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927 (Ellenborough, J.); see also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 4, § 65. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "the plaintiff's contributory
negligence may be... an intentional and unreasonable exposure of himself to danger cre-
ated by defendant's negligence, of which danger the plaintiff knows or has reason to know."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 466 (1965).
oI Davies, 152 Eng. Rep. at 588.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 589; see also supra text accompanying note 104.
109 Davies, 152 Eng. Rep. at 589 (emphasis added). Lord Abinger was of the opinion
that it made no difference whether or not the ass was lawfully on the highway, "for as the
defendant might, by proper care, have avoided the animal, and did not, he is liable for the
consequences of his negligence . . . ." Id.
110 Baron Parke was of the opinion that "the negligence which is to preclude a plaintiff
from recovering in an action of this nature must be such as that he could, by ordinary care,
have avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence." Id.; see also infra note 122
(discussing Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 281 N.W. 261 (Minn. 1938)). The Restatement
(Second) of Torts states that "[an act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes
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Thomas Schelling gave the first clear verbal statement of how
the first mover may gain an advantage in strategic situations in-
volving sequential action, as, for example, in situations where am-
biguity exists as to right of way, where two vehicles meet on a nar-
row road or approach an intersection, or where one vehicle on the
entrance ramp of a highway is trying to break into a stream of
traffic."' Schelling showed that there is a rational strategy for
resolving such conflicts to one's advantage. If driver one can make
an irrevocable commitment in a way that is unambiguously visible
to driver two, say by speeding up so as to enter an intersection
first," 2 driver one can squeeze the range of indeterminacy down to
the point most favorable to her or him. 1 3 The commitment prob-
lem is nicely illustrated by the legal doctrine of last clear chance," 4
which recognizes that, in the events leading up to an accident, at
or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the negli-
gent or reckless conduct of the other or a third person." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 302A (1965).
. SCHELLING, supra note 91, at 24, 32, 37.
..2 But see Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 177 P.2d 279, 285 (Cal. 1947) (dis-
cussed infra note 115).
H3 George Vecsey, King Richard [Petty, Champion Car Racer], in Heavy Traffic in
New York, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 1988, at B12.
Philosophical question: Should one drive aggressively or defensively in city traffic?
Petty replied: "it depends what your goal is. With taxi drivers, they have to be
aggressive because it's their living. I'm not in any hurry, so I should be defensive."
He said he relates to drivers of commercial vehicles because "they got to make a
living, so you don't holler at them too much when they cut you off." ... After
Petty signaled for a right into the garage, a bicyclist tried to cut him off. Petty
turned anyway, and the bicyclist swerved into the curb losing his own game of
chicken. Petty chuckled about it all the way back to the Waldorf Astoria.
Id.
114 See, e.g., Perin v. Nelson & Sloan, 259 P.2d 959, 960-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953). In
Perin, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries when a truck operated by one of the defend-
ant's employees was backed onto plaintiff's foot. Id. at 960. The court upheld a jury verdict
for the plaintiff and denied the defendant's contention that the trial court committed preju-
dicial error in instructing the jury on the doctrine of last clear chance. Id. at 961.
An instruction stating the doctrine is proper when there is evidence showing: "(1)
That plaintiff has been negligent and, as a result thereof, is in a position of danger
from which he cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary care; and this includes
not only where it is physically impossible for him to escape, but also in cases
where he is totally unaware of his danger, and for that reason unable to escape; (2)
that defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff is in such a situation, and knows,
or in the exercise of ordinary care should know, that plaintiff cannot escape from
such situation, and (3) has the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising
ordinary care, and fails to exercise the same, and the accident results thereby, and
plaintiff is injured as the proximate result of such failure."
Id. at 960-61 (quoting Daniels v. City & County of San Francisco, 255 P.2d 785, 788 (Cal.
1953).
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some point the accident became inevitable as a result of prior ac-
tions, and that the abilities of the two parties to prevent it may not
have expired at the same time. The irrevocable commitment is a
device that leaves the last clear chance to decide the outcome with
the other person, in a manner that that person fully appreciates; it
is to relinquish further initiative, having rigged the incentives so
that the other person must choose in one's favor. If driver one
speeds up so that she or he cannot stop and driver two realizes it,
the latter has to yield or an accident will occur.115 As is clear from
the examples used to illustrate Schelling's analysis, automobile
cases involving sequential decisions occur frequently and are a fer-
tile source of litigation.116
Consider a simple but formal statement of a model that dem-
onstrates that the least cost-avoider may gain an advantage by
moving first in strategic situations involving certain knowledge and
sequential action, so that the least cost-avoider can shift the bur-
den of avoiding harm to the higher cost-avoider, the second mover.
Assume that the expected damage from an accident is $1000 (PL)
and that it can avoided by either the least cost-avoider at a cost of
$50 (B) or the high cost-avoider at a cost of $100 (B). If this were a
model in which each person had certain knowledge of each other's
costs and both persons acted simultaneously, the least cost-avoider
would be liable because, as shown in Section I, the high cost-
avoider would be justified in assuming that the least cost-avoider
would act with due care. Now, however, assume that the least cost-
avoider is the first mover. This model is depicted in Figure 2 (next
page).
See, e.g., Satterlee, 177 P.2d at 285.
If as stated by... [plaintiff], when he observed the bus it was about twice as far
from the intersection and traveling at approximately the same speed as his own
vehicle, then he reasonably was justified, the jury could have concluded, in assum-
ing that the bus would not dangerously increase its speed in order to enter the
intersection first. Certainly by his own act of increasing speed or "racing for the
intersection" an automobile driver should not be allowed to charge the operator of
the other vehicle in the collision with negligence per se without the right to prove
justification for the statutory violation.
Id.
116 There are dozens, if not hundreds of reported decisions involving automobile acci-
dents at street intersections. See Morris v. Bloomgren, 187 N.E. 2 (Ohio 1933); Caines v.
Wofsey, 167 A. 733 (Conn. 1933); BARNEs & STOUT, supra note 2, ch. 3A, at 30; see also
Annotation, 175 A.L.R. 1013 (1948), 136 A.L.R. 1497 (1942), 89 A.L.R. 838 (1934) (collecting
decisions involving automobile accidents at street intersections).
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EXPECTED BRANCH OF
SOCIAL DECISION
COST TREE$100
Prevent Cost of preventing (1)
$50 damage, $150
Prevent 2ND
Do Not Least cost of (2)
Prevent preventing
damage, $50$0
1 ST
$100 Cost of (3)
preventing
damage, $100
Do Not Prevent second best
Prevent 2ND solution
$0 Do Not Damage, (4)
Prevent L= $1000$0
Figure 2. Certain Knowledge and Seqizential Decisions
The first mover has a choice of either preventing the accident
by spending $50 or not preventing the accident and spending $0. If
the first mover chooses a Do Not Prevent strategy, the least cost
method of preventing the accident cannot occur because the
branch (2) of the decision tree which contains that outcome is no
longer relevant. Given the condition that the first mover chooses a
Do Not Prevent strategy, the second mover confronts a choice be-
tween a Prevent strategy, in which it must spend $100 to prevent
the expected damage, branch (3), or a Do Not Prevent strategy, in
which it spends $0 and allows the expected damage of $1000 to
occur, branch (4). Given the first mover's failure to prevent the
damage, the second mover has been put into a position where the
second mover has the last clear chance to avoid the harm. The last
clear chance represents the "second best" solution." 7 Thus, in the
context of a model that assumes legal certainty and sequential ac-
... In Figure 2, branch (2) of the decision tree, where the first mover chooses a Prevent
Strategy and the second mover chooses a Do Not Prevent strategy, has the lowest total
social cost of $50. Branch (3) of the decision tree, where the first mover chooses a Do Not
Prevent Strategy and the second mover chooses a Prevent strategy, has the second lowest
total cost; therefore it is the "second best" choice. The other two branches of the decision
tree, (1) and (4), have still higher social costs of $150 and $1000. See MANSFIELD, supra note
32, at 493-94; R.G. Lipsey & Kevin Lancaster. The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV.
ECON. STUD. 11 (1956-57).
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tion, the first mover has a decided advantage." 8
It is difficult to conceive of a second mover advantage in this
model because the nearly insurmountable problem for the second
mover is to find a way to make a commitment in advance not to
use care that will be creditable to the first mover."' In other
words, a second mover can claim that it will not take care when it
moves, but if the first mover refuses to believe this threat and does
not take care, the first mover advantage is reinstated.2 0
Assume that both parties, because of intention or negligence,
choose a Do Not Prevent strategy, and the expected harm occurs.
What legal standards will give the first mover an incentive to take
care in the future and will also give the second mover an incentive
to take care if faced with the last clear chance in the future? It is
easily shown that the all-or-none contributory negligence defense,
which gives total victory to one party or the other, cannot accom-
plish these dual objectives. Consider which legal standards give the
second mover an incentive to choose a Prevent strategy when con-
fronted with last clear chance in the future. The second mover can
be either the plaintiff-victim as in Butterfield or the defendant-
injurer as in Davies. If the second mover is the Butterfield-like
plaintiff-victim, it does not matter whether the plaintiff's conduct
is evaluated by the contributory negligence defense or comparative
negligence because the plaintiff, who effectively has the last clear
chance, will receive no compensation under the former or substan-
tially reduced or no compensation under the latter standard. 2 ' If,
however,i the second mover is the Davies-like defendant-injurer,
comparative negligence is efficient but the contributory negligence
defense is not: under comparative negligence, the defendant-wag-
oner, who rejected the last clear chance, will be required to pay
substantial compensation to the plaintiff-donkey-owner; but, under
the contributory negligence defense without a last clear chance ex-
ception, a defendant, who rejected the last clear chance, will not be
required to compensate the plaintiff whose contributory negligence
bars it from compensation; that is, under the contributory negli-
gence defense, the defendant will have little incentive to take the
"8 VARiAN, supra note 7, at 474-76.
119 Id. at 476.
120 See SCHELLING, supra note 91, at 38.
121 Plaintiff would receive no compensation under comparative negligence with a 50%
or 51% threshold and substantially reduced compensation under pure comparative negli-
gence. See supra note 52.
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last clear chance.122
Next, consider which legal standards give the first mover an
incentive to choose a Prevent strategy initially, when it makes the
first move. If the first mover is the defendant-injurer as in Butter-
field, comparative negligence is in general efficient,123 but the con-
tributory negligence defense is not efficient because of the possibil-
ity that the intentional or negligent actions of the first mover will
be immunized by the negligence of the second mover, as in fact
happened in Butterfield.124 If the first mover is the plaintiff-victim
as in Davies, both the contributory negligence defense and com-
parative negligence will give it efficient incentives not to use its
first mover's advantage.125
To appreciate the effect of sequential action in Butterfield and
Davies, assume that the facts are the same in each case except that
the accidents occurred in the unlit dark of night. Is it not clear
that the decision would be reversed in both cases? In Butterfield,
the plaintiff-horseman had the last clear chance because, as second
mover, he should have seen the obstruction. If, however, the acci-
dent had occurred on an unlit night, the plaintiff could not be ex-
pected to see and would have no reason to know of the obstruction.
Is it not clear that the plaintiff-horseman and not the defendant-
122 See supra text accompanying note 109 (quoting Baron Parke); Haeg v. Sprague,
Warner & Co., 281 N.W. 261 (Minn. 1938). Haeg involved a motor vehicle collision at an
intersection of a gravel road and a highway. The plaintiff, who entered the intersection from
the gravel road and was crossing the highway from left to right, said: "I entered the intersec-
tion first, and I expected him to slack up and let me through." Id. at 261. Plaintiff stressed
his supposed right to assume that defendant would exercise ordinary care to avoid a colli-
sion. The defendant, who entered the intersection from the highway, had the statutory
right-of-way because he was on the plaintiff's right. Nevertheless, the jury ruled for the
plaintiff, possibly because it believed that the defendant had the last clear chance and re-
jected it. The supreme court reversed the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for
judgment n.o.v., stating that "it is not due care to depend upon the exercise of care by
another when such dependence is itself accompanied by obvious danger." Id. at 262. In
dicta, the court said: "It would be hard to imagine a case more illustrative of the truth that
in operation the rule of comparative negligence Zvould serve justice more faithfully than that
of contributory negligence." Id. at 263.
123 If the first mover is the defendant-injurer, comparative negligence standards are in
general efficient, because defendant will not totally escape liability to the plaintiff even
though plaintiff had the last clear chance.
124 See supra note 115 (discussing Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist. 177 P.2d 279
(Cal. 1947)).
2 Because the first mover, the plaintiff-victim, is negligent, it will receive nothing
under the all-or-none contributory negligence standard or under a comparative negligence
standard with a 50% or 51% threshold and will receive substantially reduced compensation
under a pure comparative negligence standard.
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homeowner would win this hypothetical case because the plaintiff
can reasonably expect that the defendant, who at night is surely
the least cost-avoider, will use due care and remove the obstruc-
tion.126 This hypothetical case is much more like the standard eco-
nomic model, since darkness tends to remove the sequential as-
pect; if the plaintiff cannot see the obstruction, it is as if the
parties are acting simultaneously. If Davies happened at night, its
outcome would also be reversed because in darkness, the defend-
ant-wagoner could not be expected to see the ass on the road; in
darkness, the hypothetical would be less like a sequential decision
case, and more like a simultaneous action case in which the plain-
tiff-donkey driver was the least cost-avoider.
B. Joint Care and Sequential Action
In LeRoy Fibre,127 the railroad line was actually constructed
some years before the flax factory was built, 2 ' that is, the flax fac-
tory "came to" the railroad.1 29 Assume that when the LeRoy Fibre
Company makes its decision as to how far from the railroad tracks
it should place its flax stacks, it knows with certainty that Railroad
has not installed a spark arrester and refuses to do so. The new
assumption changes the model of negligence from the standard one
in which action occurs simultaneously to a model in which action
occurs sequentially and in which the railroad is the first mover.
The effect of the sequential assumption on the model is illus-
trated in Table 1 (p. 21). Given that the LeRoy Fibre Company
knows that the Railroad has not installed spark arresters, would a
decision by the LeRoy Fibre Company to place its flax stacks 100
feet from the railroad tracks, which decision was efficient when
levels of precaution were chosen simultaneously, be efficient in the
M28 During the daylight hours, absent the sequential element, it is difficult to say which
of the two parties in Butterfield is the least cost-avoider, particularly since it depends on
the structural necessity of having the pole sticking out into the street. It can be argued that
removing the pole would remove the threat not only to this but to other riders whereas the
alternative is that each rider independently takes measures to avoid the pole. That would
make the defendant the least cost-avoider of accidents. BANES & STOUT, supra note 2,
Teacher's Manual, ch. 3, at 10.
27 See supra text accompanying notes 61-72.
128 LeRoy Fibre, 232 U.S. at 341-42.
129 Cf. Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 331 P.2d. 539 (Kan. 1958) (cattle feed lot). See gener-
ally KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 88B, at 634-36 (discussing doctrine of "coming to a
nuisance"); Staton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 61 S.E. 455 (N.C. 1908) (denying injunction,
but awarding damages, against railroad because of heavy investment and plaintiff's moving
to it).
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case where levels of precaution are chosen sequentially? The an-
swer is no. The combination of no spark arresters and flax stacks
100 feet from the railroad tracks is not one of the care combina-
tions that would avoid the $1000 loss. Given that the LeRoy Fibre
Company knows that the Railroad has not installed spark arrest-
ers, the LeRoy Fibre Company, as second mover, should tempora-
rily place its flax stacks at a distance of 200 feet rather than 100
feet from the tracks so as to avoid the harm. It should spend $100
(an increase of $50) to avoid a $1000 loss; in terms of the Hand
formula, B($100) < PL($1000). The LeRoy Fibre Company should
begin a nuisance action against the railroad, requesting that the
railroad be enjoined from operating engines without spark arrest-
ers. Once the railroad is so enjoined, the LeRoy Fibre Company
can then place its stacks 100 feet from the tracks.130 What legal
standard will give the LeRoy Fibre Company, as second mover, an
efficient incentive to avoid the damage and effect the efficient re-
sult through litigation?
As shown in Section I, under the standard economic model of
negligence with its legal certainty and simultaneous action assump-
tions, both the contributory negligence defense and comparative
negligence standard provide equally efficient incentives for plain-
tiffs. Given a model with legal certainty and sequential action,
however, only a comparative negligence standard will give the
plaintiff an efficient incentive to avoid a wasteful loss when the
plaintiff is the second mover. If the plaintiff's conduct is evaluated
with the all-or-none contributory negligence defense, a dilemma re-
sults: either the plaintiff is held not to be contributorily negligent,
even though it had the last clear chance to avoid a $1000 loss by
placing its flax stacks 200 feet rather than 100 feet from the tracks
at a cost of $100 (a mere increase in cost of $50), or the plaintiff is
held to be contributorily negligent and receives no compensation
even though its level of precaution, placing its flax stacks 100 feet
from the tracks, would have been optimal had the railroad taken
due care. The first possibility allows the plaintiff full compensation
even though it knowingly "caused" a $1000 harm that it could have
avoided for a mere $100; the second possibility causes plaintiff to
bear the entire loss even though the defendant's conduct is com-
paratively more negligent. In either case, the contributory negli-
gence defense does not create efficient incentives. Similar reason-
..0 The least cost solution in the second column of Table 1 (p. 21) would be reinstated.
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ing applies to the railroad if it came to an already densely
populated area.
III. UNCERTAINTY AND SIMULTANEOUS ACTION: DEFENSIVE CARE
MODEL
We now alter the legal certainty assumption of the standard
economic model and assume that the parties and courts act under
conditions of uncertainty. Contributions to the economic model of
negligence under conditions of uncertainty were made by .Mark
Grady13 1 and by Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen.132 Initially, four
problems, which occur when there is uncertain knowledge in uni-
tary care cases, are discussed. Specifically, the difficulty in quanti-
fying the Hand variables-B, P, and L-is illustrated by Helling v.
Carey.133 Next, we consider three problems of causation due to un-
certainty: (1) uncertainty about the injurer's identity, (2) uncer-
tainty about the victim's identity, and (3) uncertainty about the
efficient level of precaution. Finally, an alternative care model
based upon the assumptions of uncertainty and simultaneous ac-
tion is constructed. The conclusions that in defensive care models
redundant care is often efficient and that a comparative negligence
standard is more efficient than a contributory negligence defense
are illustrated by Kerr v. Hayes.13
A. Unitary Care and Uncertainty
1. Difficulty in Quantifying the Hand Formula Variables B, P,
and L
The assumption of legal certainty employed in the standard
economic model means that all persons and courts know the effi-
cient level of precaution (level E in Figure 1, p. 10) and can employ
the Hand test with exactness. But in the real world of uncertain
knowledge, it is difficult to quantify the Hand test. Judge Posner
has written that he knows of no case in which a court attached
" See Grady, Positive Theory, supra note 21; Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra
note 21.
" 2 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (1986). When the legal standard is set at the efficient level, evidentiary
uncertainty will cause overprecaution relative to the efficient level. Under certain conditions
this overprecaution is less under comparative negligence than under any other form of the
negligence rule. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 401.
519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
"' 229 N.W. 430 (Mich. 1930).
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numbers to all of the formula's three terms-B, P, and L.'35 As a
result the Hand test usually is used as a qualitative framework to
analyze whether the defendant was negligent in not having under-
taken a particular precaution. 3 6
Consider the well known case of Helling v. Carey,' which is
generally cited as one of the few cases in which it was possible to
make a quantitative estimate of P, the probability of the harm oc-
curring. 3 8 The plaintiff first consulted the defendant ophthalmolo-
gists for myopia (nearsightedness) in 1959. At that time she was
fitted with contact lenses. She consulted the defendants several
times over the next nine years for problems the defendants consid-
ered to be related solely to complications associated with contact
lenses. In October 1968, a defendant tested plaintiff's eye pressure
and field of vision for glaucoma for the first time and found that
she had it." e The plaintiff was thirty-two years old. 40 The issue
was whether the defendant ophthalmologists' compliance with the
standard of their profession, which did not require the giving of a
routine pressure test to persons under 40 years of age, should insu-
late them from liability where the plaintiff lost a substantial
amount of her vision because of the untimely failure to test the
plaintiff.14 ' The court held that the defendants were negligent as a
matter of law. 142
Using medical evidence, the court found that for persons
under the age of forty, the probability of having glaucoma is one in
25,000.14' Thus, the probability of harm, P, is 0.00004. The court
did not attempt to quantify the Hand test's other two variables,
but discussed them qualitatively: "The test [with respect to B, the
burden (cost of accident prevention)] is a simple pressure test, rel-
atively inexpensive," and the result of the disease [L, the damage],
11. POSNER, supra note 68, at 224.
13 Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 21, at 140. "For practicing lawyers, the
critical choice is properly identifying which untaken precaution will be the gist of the plain-
tiff's case." Id.
13" 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
1.. WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND EcoNoMics 209 (2d ed.1988).
139 Helling, 519 P.2d at 981.
140 Id. at 982.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 983. In 1975, a year after the Washington Supreme Court's ruling in Helling,
the Washington legislature enacted a statute requiring health care standards to be estab-
lished only by health care professionals and not by courts in judicial proceedings. WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (West 1975).
"I Helling, 519 P.2d at 983.
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which causes loss of vision and ends in blindness if untreated, is
"grave and devastating."144 The inherent difficulty in quantifying
the other two Hand variables in this case is apparent when one
considers that economists who have attempted such quantification
have reached different conclusions regarding the defendants' negli-
gence. Hirsch estimated B to represent "about 10 minutes of a doc-
tor's time, let us say $30."145 Cooter and Ulen "[s]uppose that a
tonometry test, which will detect glaucoma, costs $5. ''146 These
economists agreed that the average jury verdict for total or legal
blindness in the period 1973-1977, which was $678,000, should be
used as an estimate of L.'47 Given these estimates, Hirsch con-
cluded that defendants were not negligent: B($30) > PL
(0.00004)($678,000), or simplified, B($30) > PL($27),1 4s whereas
Cooter and Ulen concluded that defendants were negligent, B($5)
< PL (0.00004)($678,000), or simplified, B($5) < PL($27). 149
In determining the expected damage (PL) from not taking a
precaution, the trier of fact must consider not only the expected
damage from the accident that occurred, but also the expected
damage of any other similar, reasonably foreseeable accidents that
the precaution would have prevented. For example, when a rail-
road engineer fails to blow the train's horn as a warning that it is
about to move, which cost of care is small (small B), there is not
only a probability (P1) that hearing the horn would save the life of
an inspector who had crawled under a car (L1), but also a
probability (P2) that hearing the horn would save an inspector
leaning on a car (L2) and a probability (P3) that hearing the horn
would save railroad employee doing repairs on the top of a car
(L3), a brakeman straddling two cars (P4L4), or a person who might
have business in or on (as well as under) a car (P5L). 150 To be
rigorously accurate, the Hand test should be written as B < Z
14 Id.
115 HiRSCH, supra note 138, at 209.
146 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 379.
147 Id.; HIRSCH, supra note 138, at 210.
14 HIRSCH, supra note 138, at 210.
'49 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 620.
150 Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.);
see also Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1403 (1961)
(discussing controversy between those who argue for "liability for all the consequences of
negligent conduct whether reasonably foreseeable or not" versus "liability only for the con-
sequences of negligent conduct that should have been reasonably foreseen.").
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PL.151 Moreover, when the defendant could have taken more than
one precaution, plaintiff's lawyer must identify which untaken pre-
caution(s) will pass the Hand test.152
2. Uncertainty, Unitary Care, and Causation
We now consider three problems of causation due to uncer-
tainty: (1) uncertainty about the injurer's identity, (2) uncertainty
151 The 2; symbol represents "summation" and 7, PL = P1L1 + P2L2 + P3L 3 + ...
PnLn (where n stands for the nth or last reasonably foreseeable harm that will be avoided by
blowing the horn). In terms of Figure 1 (p. 10), if blowing the train's horn is the level of
precaution indicated by level E, then Z PL is measured by the height of the Cost of Acci-
dent Damage curve at E.
152 See, e.g., Davis, 788 F.2d at 1262-68 (Posner, J.). In Davis, an inspector of railroad
cars, whose job required him to crawl underneath the cars to look for cracks, lost a leg and a
foot when the train moved without blowing its horn as a warning. Id. at 1262. The jury
found for the plaintiff. Id. On the question of the railroad's negligence, the plaintiff alleged
three untaken precautions. First, the railroad employee who saw the plaintiff in an un-
marked truck should have notified the train crew of his presence. Id. at 1263. Speaking for
the court, Judge Posner said derisively that if the employee had done so, the train crew
would have replied, so what? Id. Second, the plaintiff suggested that before the train moved,
a member of the crew should have walked the entire length of the train, looking under each
car, and back to the engine, a distance of a mile and a half, which might have taken an hour
to complete. Id. at 1264. Judge Posner opined that this second alleged untaken precaution
was even more fantastic than the first. Id. Finally, the plaintiff asserted that the train crew
was negligent in not blowing the horn before moving the train. Id. Judge Posner regarded
this untaken precaution as more plausible; a reasonable jury could find that it was impru-
dent to move the train without signaling in advance. Id. Moreover, Judge Posner stated that
the defendant's assertion that the horn would not have been heard at the other end of the
train, three-quarters of a mile away, was implausible and unsubstantiated. Id. As to the
defendant's claim that blowing a horn every time a train moved would cause a cacophony
that would deprive the horn of its efficacy as a warning, Judge Posner said that the defend-
ant had put in no evidence on how busy the marshalling yard was at that time or at any
other time. Id. at 1264-65.
In McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.), the plain-
tiff was attacked in a second-floor hotel room by a man who had gained entrance through a
sliding glass door that had been closed, but not locked. Id. at 1555. The intruder had pried
it open from the outside, breaking the security chain. Id. The jury found for the defendant.
Id. On appeal, Judge Posner said that the plaintiff made little effort to show that there were
untaken precautions of reasonable cost and efficacy that would have prevented the mishap.
Id. at 1557.
No effort was made to inform the jury what it would have cost to equip every
room [in the hotel] with a new lock, and whether the lock would have been jimmy-
proof.. . . And since the door to [plaintiff's] room was unlocked, what good would
a better lock have done? No effort was made, either, to specify an optimal security
force for a resort [of this size]. No one considered the fire or other hazards that a
second-floor walkway not accessible from ground level would create.
Id. Judge Posner also noted that a notice telling guests to lock their doors would be inex-
pensive, but because this is common knowledge, especially with respect to sliding doors on a
walkway, not a balcony, the benefits from such warning would be slight. Id.
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about the victim's identity, and (3) uncertainty about the efficient
level of precaution. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,I is a leading
case that involves uncertainty about an injurer's identity.15 The
plaintiff, who was injured as the result of a drug her mother took
during pregnancy, knew the name of the generic drug, DES, but
did not know the manufacturer of the precise product.15 On the
issue of causation, the court held defendants liable upon a proba-
bilistic basis: each defendant was liable for the percentage of the
total product market for which it accounted. 56
Uncertainty about the victim's identity can occur when an in-
jurer increases the risk of a disease above the "background" level,
for example, by negligent discharge into the atmosphere of a can-
cer-causing chemical. The issue is whether a particular discharge
was "the" cause of a particular person's cancer. A probabilistic so-
lution has been suggested: the injury could be defined as the in-
creased risk of cancer to the whole population so exposed, which
population could be allowed to use the class action device for re-
covery of the percentage of damages accounted for by the in-
creased risk. 57
When the efficient level of precaution is uncertain, uncertainty
exists about whether the Hand test can be applied correctly, that
is, over small increments of care (marginally). The following hypo-
thetical will explain why, because of uncertain knowledge, the
Hand test may be applied incorrectly and thereby obscure cause-
in-fact problems. Suppose that an automobile accident occurs, and
all that is known is that the expected damage, PL = $10, could
have been eliminated if the defendant driver had been driving 30
miles per hour slower because of the shorter stopping distance re-
quired at a lower speed; assume the cost of driving slower is $9
(B). "'58 Given this limited information, the defendant would be neg-
ligent under the Hand test because B($9) < PL($10).
But, an omniscient court, one in which legal certainty was as-
sumed, familiar with the cost-benefit functions depicted in Figure
3 (next page), would know that most of the reduction in expected
607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 168.
15 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926. DES is an acronym for diethylstilbestrol.
,' Id. at 937; see also David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849 (1984).
"I PosNER, supra note 1, at 168.
I's Id. at 148.
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damage, from PL ($10) to PL ($1), occurs because of a reduction in
speed by 10 miles per hour and that such reduction in speed costs
only B ($2). This implies that elimination of the last dollar in ex-
pected harm, from PL ($1) to PL ($0), requires an additional re-
duction in speed of 20 miles per hour and costs B ($7). Figure 3
shows that the efficient level of precaution (driving 62 m.p.h.
rather than 70 m.p.h.) requires a reduction in speed of approxi-
mately 8 miles per hour. In other words, an omniscient court would
be able to apply the Hand test correctly, in small increments (mar-
ginally).159 An omniscient court would find the defendant not
guilty; even if the defendant were driving 8 miles per hour too fast,
the defendant's negligence was not the cause-in-fact of the injury
because such injury would have occurred even if defendant had
driven 8 miles per hour slower, since by hypothesis, the accident
could only have been avoided by a reduction of 30 miles per hour.
10
9
$ B
2
1 -PL
I II I
70 62 60 40 CARE IS INVERSELY
miles per hour RELATED TO SPEED
Figure 3. The Marginal Hand Test (The correct application of the
Hand test requires that the cost of accident damage be
compared to the cost of accident prevention over small increments).
Thus, when knowledge of the cost-benefit functions and effi-
cient level of precaution are uncertain, the level of untaken precau-
tion that can be used to show a breach of duty is not fixed, but
"I See id. at 148-49; Brown, supra note 3, at 331-35.
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depends on the width of the increment to which the Hand test is
applied and the injurer's actual level of precaution. By reducing
the level of precaution taken, the injurer creates more opportuni-
ties for the victim to use a broader increment to show a breach of
duty, even though such breach may not be a cause-in-fact of the
injury.160
B. Uncertainty and Simultaneous Action: The Defensive Care
Model
An economist, William Vickrey, has asserted that "it is just as
important to provide an adequate incentive for driving defensively
rather than merely nonnegligently as it is to provide an incentive
for driving nonnegligently rather than recklessly.'' 1 The defensive
care model discussed in this section is an alternative care model in
which redundant care is often efficient; that is, the model shows
that there are situations in which the high cost-avoider, because of
uncertainty, should not rely on the least cost-avoider to take care
but should act or drive defensively. Kerr v. Hayes6 2 will illustrate
the defensive care model, which model will also be used to analyze
Jackson, previously discussed in connection with the standard eco-
nomic model.163
Kerr involved an automobile collision at the intersection of
two streets, neither of which was a stop street, trunk highway, or
superior to the other. The plaintiff was driving south at about 15
miles per hour, and the defendant was driving west at about 35 to
40 miles per hour. 164 Although the plaintiff had a clear view for 85
feet to the east, he did not look to his left, nor did he see the de-
fendant's automobile at any time until an instant before the colli-
sion.' 65 The sole basis for the plaintiff's claim of freedom from con-
1"0 See Grady, Positive Theory, supra note 21, at 817. "[T]he maximum level of un-
taken precaution that can be used to show breach of duty is not fixed, but depends on the
injurer's actual level of precaution.... Thus, as the injurer takes less precaution, he creates
more opportunities for the victim to show a breach of duty." Id. at 815-16. In Reynolds v.
Texas & Pac. Ry., 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885), plaintiff tripped on steps that were both un-
lighted and had no hand rail; moreover, passengers were pressured to "hurry up." Id. at 697;
see also Malone, supra note 82, at 74 (1956) (discussing interdependence of policy and fac-
tual likelihood in cause-in-fact determination).
6I William Vickrey, Automobile Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance:
An Economist's Critique, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 467 (1968).
162 229 N.W. 430 (Mich. 1930).
,6' See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
Kerr, 229 N.W. at 430.
160 Id.
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tributory negligence was that by being on the defendant's right,
the plaintiff had the right of way at the intersection.1 66 In reversing
the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of
Michigan said that case law indicates that
the statutory right of way is not an assurance of safety, nor an
absolute right in all conditions, but that both drivers must use
due care. A driver cannot continue to assume that the one on the
left will accord him right of way when the circumstances would
indicate the contrary to a reasonable person.167
Because the plaintiff did not look to the left, he could not have
formed any belief from the conditions. The court stated that the
plaintiff was chargeable with having seen what he should have
seen, that defendant's car was about twice the distance from the
intersection as his own, approaching at about twice his own speed,
without ever giving any indication of according plaintiff the right
of way, and that a collision was inevitable unless the plaintiff took
measures to avoid it. 6 '
Consider the following model: assume that if an accident oc-
curs the damage will be $1000, and that the accident can be
avoided either by the least cost-avoider at a cost of $5 or by the
high cost-avoider at a cost of $10. If this model employed the stan-
dard economic assumptions of legal certainty and simultaneous ac-
tion, it is clear that the least cost-avoider should always take care
and the high cost-avoider should never take care. However, in this
model, which assumes a significant probability that both parties
will be uncertain which of them is the least cost-avoider, it will be
shown that both should take care as a defensive measure whether
or not they believe they are the least cost-avoider; such defensive
care will minimize social cost even though it is redundant most of
the time. 69
166 Id.
167 Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
Id.; see also Geeck v. Luckenbill, 183 N.W. 729 (Mich. 1921) (holding plaintiff negli-
gent as matter of law despite defendant's duty to allow plaintiff right of way).
6I A model that assumes substantial uncertainty and simultaneous action should be an
alternative care model rather than a joint care model. The joint care case is superfluous, or,
as economists would say, it is a "degenerate" solution. If the probability that a party may
not choose the joint care solution because of uncertainty is substantial, the only way to
minimize social costs is for the other party to adopt an alternative care solution. This is true
even if a least cost, joint care case-which requires both parties to coordinate their ac-
tions-exists (recall the least cost solution of the second column in Table 1, p. 21, which was
used to illustrate LeRoy Fibre). See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
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1. Model IIIa: Only the Least Cost-Avoider Is Uncertain
Assume for the moment that some unspecified probability ex-
ists that the least cost-avoider will mistakenly believe the other
person is the least cost-avoider. If the probability that the least
cost-avoider will make a mistake is greater than 0.005, it is easy to
show that social cost would be minimized if the high cost-avoider
rather than the least cost-avoider takes care. If the high cost-
avoider takes care, the cost of care will be $10, and no damage will
result, for a social cost of $10; alternatively, if the least cost-
avoider is relied upon to take care, expected social cost will not be
as low as $10 unless the probability that the least cost-avoider is
careless due to uncertainty is less than 0.005.170 The intuitive rea-
son for this conclusion is that unless the probability of an accident
due to the least cost-avoider's uncertainty is extremely small, ex-
pected harm will exceed $10.
2. Model IIIb: Both Parties Are Uncertain Who the Least Cost-
Avoider Is
Assume that neither party takes care all the time because of
uncertainty. Specifically, assume some unspecified probability ex-
Moreover, the joint care solution in which one party warns the other to take care is not
relevant in this model because the assumption that both parties must decide whether or not
to take care simultaneously rules out previous interaction. It is a standard assumption in
torts models that neither contracts nor interactions exist between the parties prior to tor-
tious activity: "[R]ules of tort law concern relationships between people for whom the ex
ante costs of bargaining about the harm are high and who cannot, therefore, enter into a
contractual relationship." COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 341 (emphasis omitted); see also
POSNER, supra note 1, at 230; SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 1. The joint care solution that
involves a warning by one party to the other will figure prominently in the foreseeable negli-
gence model discussed in Section IV. See infra text accompanying notes 176-223.
Posner contends that "[m]ost collisions are joint care cases." POSNER, supra note 1, at
155. However, since the rules of the road usually provide that one car or the other, but not
both, has the right of way in almost all situations, most collisions are better described as
alternative care cases. If collisions are categorized as examples of joint care, this "jointness"
is unlike the joint care solution discussed in Leroy Fibre in Section I, see supra text accom-
panying notes 61-73, in which case joint care was less costly than either of the alternative
care solutions; in the defensive care models IlIa and IIIb of this section, as well as in most
automobile collisions, joint or redundant care is more expensive than the alternative care
solutions.
1 0 Relying solely on the least cost-avoider to take care, the expected social cost is equal
to (x)($1000) + (1 - x)($5), where the first term, the expected cost of accident damage (the
probability that the least cost-avoider will be careless (x) multiplied by the harm ($1000)), is
added to the second term, the expected cost of accident prevention (the probability that the
least cost-avoider will take care to prevent an accident (1 - x) multiplied by the cost of
taking care ($5)). Thus, the total social cost is less than $10, if and only if x < 0.005).
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ists that each party will mistakenly believe that it is the other:
there is some likelihood that the least cost-avoider will mistakenly
think that it is the high cost-avoider and will not take care; there is
an equal likelihood that the high cost-avoider will mistakenly
think that it is the least cost-avoider and will take care. This as-
sumption, that the parties may be mistaken as to who is the least
cost-avoider, is realistic, given the acknowledged difficulty of quan-
tifying the variables in the Hand formula.17 1 Unless the probability
that each will mistakenly believe it is the other party is less than
0.01 or greater than 0.995, at which probability the parties have
almost totally switched identities, it is easy to demonstrate that
defensive care (which is often redundant care), where both parties
take care regardless of whether they believe they are the least cost-
avoider, is more efficient than alternative care where they take care
only when they believe themselves to be the least cost-avoider. If
both parties take care all the time, the cost of care will be $5 +
$10, for a social cost of $15, and no damage will result; alterna-
tively, if parties only take care when they think themselves to be
the least cost-avoider, expected social cost will be higher than $15
unless the probability that the parties will mistake their identities
because of uncertainty is less than 0.01 or greater than 0.995.12
'7' See supra text accompanying notes 137-152 (discussing Helling v. Carey).
"72 Let x equal the probability that the least cost-avoider will mistakenly believe that it
is the high cost-avoider and not take care to prevent an accident; the expected social cost of
sole reliance on the least cost-avoider, as in model IlIa, is equal to (x)($1000) + (1 - x)($5).
In model IIIb, x is also the probability that the high cost-avoider will mistakenly believe it is
the least cost-avoider and will take care to prevent an accident; therefore, (1 - x) equals the
probability that the high cost avoider will not take care to prevent an accident. The ex-
pected social cost of sole reliance on the high cost-avoider to prevent accidents is equal to (1
- x)($1000) + (x)($10), where the first term ((1 - x)($1000)) is equal to the expected cost of
accident damage from the high cost-avoider and the second term ((x)($10)) is the expected
cost of accident prevention by the high cost-avoider.
Because this is an alternative care model, no accident will occur if either party takes
care, the other takes care, or both take care; these account for three of the four possible
outcomes. An accident will occur only if both do not take care, the fourth outcome; and,
because elementary probability theory dictates that the probability that one will not take
care is independent of the probability that the other will not take care, the respective
probabilities that each will not take care are multiplied to determine the probability that
both do not take care simultaneously. See LAWRENCE LAPIN, STATISTICS FOR MODERN Busi-
NESS DEcISIONs 112-13 (3d ed. 1982). Therefore, (x)(1 - x) is the probability that neither the
least cost-avoider nor high cost-avoider takes care to prevent an accident. The expected
accident damage when neither takes care is (x)(1 - x)($1000). Thus, the expected total social
cost of alternative care is (x)(1 - x)($1000) + (1 - x)($5) + (x)($10), where the first term is
the 'expected accident damage if neither prevents an accident and the second and third
terms are the expected cost of accident prevention by the least cost-avoider and high cost-
A THEORY
The intuitive reason for this conclusion is that unless the
probability of an accident due to mistaken beliefs by the parties is
extremely small, expected harm from alternative care will exceed
$15. This model may be summarized by saying that where there is
a significant probability that the parties will be mistaken as to
which one should take care, and the cost of care is small, both par-
ties must take care to minimize expected social cost. Thus, defen-
sive care is efficient in this model that assumes uncertainty and
simultaneous action.
It is also clear that as the damage decreases, or the cost of care
to the parties rises, the point at which defensive care is no longer
efficient is reached quickly. For example, if the probability that
each party will mistakenly believe it is the other is 0.01, and, if the
cost of care to the least cost- and high cost-avoider is $50 and $100,
respectively (rather than $5 and $10), then defensive care, which
would now cost $150, would no longer be efficient because it would
cost more than the expected social cost of reliance on alternative
care, which is only $60.40, where the parties take care only when
each believes it is the least cost-avoider.1 7 3 Thus, defensive care is
efficient in preventing accidents that involve great damage that can
be avoided at little cost. Since these conditions seem to character-
ize many automobile collisions, this model is unlikely to be trivial.
If Kerr17 4 were decided in the context of the standard eco-
nomic model, the court's decision would be reversed because the
plaintiff would not be contributorily negligent: Kerr would be an
alternative care case in which plaintiff, having the right of way,
would have no duty of care because it would be entitled to assume
that all other persons act with due care. However, the Supreme
Court of Michigan implicitly employed the defensive care model in
which both drivers must use due care; therefore, the plaintiff, who
avoider, respectively.
In order for the expected social cost of alternative care to be less than the redundant
defensive care, expected social cost must be less than $15 ($10 + $5). Solving (x)(1 -
x)($1000) + (1 - x)($5) + (x)($10) = $15 for x, yields two roots: x = 0.01 and x = 0.995. In
other words, unless the parties are mistaken as to their identities very infrequently or are
almost totally mistaken as to their identities, in which case they have nearly exchanged
identities, defensive care, which is redundant, is more efficient than alternative care to pre-
vent accidents.
173 The expected social cost of reliance on the alternative care to prevent accidents
where the parties take care only when each believes it is the least cost-avoider is equal to
(0.01)(0.99)($1000) + (0.99)($50) + (0.01)($100) = $60.40, which is less than the cost of
defensive care, which is $150 ($50 + $100).
74 229 N.W. 430 (Mich. 1930); see also text accompanying notes 162-69.
19921
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
did not use due care, was found contributorily negligent and re-
ceived no compensation even though he had the right of way and
defendant was speeding. It is easy to show that the contributory
negligence defense in Kerr leads to inefficient incentives.
If negligence is defined as the failureto take action that mini-
mizes expected social costs given the reasonably foreseeable level
of precaution or lack thereof taken by other persons, then within
the context of the defensive care model, as well as in Kerr, a plain-
tiff who is a high cost-avoider is negligent for not taking cost-mini-
mizing care. However, if the contributory negligence defense oper-
ates as a complete bar to negligent plaintiffs, as it did in Kerr, the
plaintiff receives no compensation even though the defendant, as
least cost-avoider, was the more negligent party. Only a compara-
tive negligence standard would hold the least cost-avoider primar-
ily liable for the accident, thus giving the least cost-avoider an in-
centive to avoid such behavior in the future and at the same time
give a high cost-avoider, who is a plaintiff-victim, an incentive to
take defensive care.
Recall that in Jackson, which was used to illustrate an alter-
native care case in the context of the standard economic model, 175
the court held that the plaintiff's failure to look a second time
when he reached the intersection was not negligent. In the context
of the defensive care model, however, Jackson would be reversed
because the plaintiff would be negligent for not looking a second
time upon reaching the intersection.
IV. UNCERTAINTY AND SEQUENTIAL ACTION: FORESEEABLE
NEGLIGENCE MODEL
In this section we begin by considering two cases involving un-
certain knowledge and sequential action, Levi v. Southwest Louisi-
ana Electric Membership Coop,'176 a negligence case, and Larsen v.
General Motors Corp.,'" a design defect, products liability case; 7 8
next, the foreseeable negligence model is discussed and is applied
to the two cases. Finally, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.'7 9 is used to
171 Jackson v. Leach, 152 A. 813, 815 (Md. 1931); see also supra notes 54-60 and accom-
panying text.
171 542 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1989).
177 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
71 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (design defect cases are de facto negli-
gence cases).
1 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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discuss cost-benefit quantification problems in the context of a
foreseeable negligence case.
In Levi, the plaintiff oil company employee sustained near fa-
tal, permanently disabling injuries when the erectable mast of a
truck that he was operating came in contact with an uninsulated
electrical line that serviced a field of oil wells. 180 With the excep-
tion of the oil well near the accident site, the power company
routed the power line to avoid crossing an oil well driveway or
coming close to a well.181 The power company failed to avoid a
close encounter between its line and the well near the accident be-
cause this well was omitted from the power company's original
construction plan, either by oversight or because no electricity was
supplied to the oil well.'- 2 The power company's employees had
warned crews of the power line danger when they drove under un-
insulated power lines with their rigs partially or fully upright. 83
The plaintiff had noticed the electrical distribution line at this lo-
cation on previous occasions but failed to pay attention to it on the
day of the accident.8 4 The plaintiff parked near the well in order
to get off the main road and find a dry place to repair the rig on
which he was working. Using control levers on the side of the truck
to raise the mast tip up over the truck and back toward the power
line, the plaintiff was severely injured when the mast either
touched the power line-some twenty-five feet above the
ground-or came close enough for electrical arcing to occur. 85
The jury found that the defendant's conduct did not fall below
the reasonable standard of care. 88 The Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana reversed on the ground that "the ordinary reasonable person,
and even more so the power company, is required to realize that
there will be a certain amount of negligence in the world"'87 and
held that the power company's negligence was a legal cause of
plaintiff's injuries. 8 8 Several precautions could have avoided the
accident: alternative care by the defendant, who could have pre-
vented the electrocution if it had insulated the overhead wire; al-
180 Levi, 542 So. 2d at 1082.
Id.
182 Id. at 1082-83.
"' Id. at 1086.
164 Id. at 1083.
185 Id.
2 Id. at 1082.
187 Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1089.
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ternative care by the plaintiff, who could have avoided the accident
by carefully scrutinizing the site and perhaps choosing another lo-
cation for the repair of the rig; or, joint, cooperative measures, such
as a warning sign on the power pole and an orange warning ball on
the power line itself combined with greater attentiveness by the
plaintiff, which would have been as effective as the more expensive
alternative care measures in preventing the accident.
In Larsen, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile collision
and sustained severe injuries to his head because of the rearward
displacement of the steering shaft.l s The plaintiff did not contend
that the automobile design caused the accident, but rather that be-
cause of the design he incurred injuries he would not have other-
wise sustained or that his injuries would not have been as severe.' °
The Eighth Circuit held that the manufacturer of an automobile is
under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its product to
avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury or en-
hancement of injury in the event of a collision, which, whether
with or without the fault of the user, is clearly foreseeable.' 9'
A. Foreseeable Negligence Model
The last clear chance model and foreseeable negligence model,
189 Larsen, 391 F.2d at 496-97.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 502-04. A strong dispute existed at one time on the issue of whether an auto-
mobile should be designed with a view to minimize the consequences of an accident. In
Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), a
new X-frame design for a car body turned out to be less safe than a conventional rectangu-
lar frame when the car was hit from the side. The court held, however, that the company
was under no duty to design an accident-proof or crash-proof car, since the intended pur-
pose of automobiles did not include its participation in a collision. Id. at 824-25. In Larsen,
the Eighth Circuit disagreed. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502. A long line of cases supported each
side. See Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 317 A.2d 494, 502-04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974);
Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer, Seller or Distributor of Motor Ve-
hicle for Defect Which Merely Enhances Injury from Accidents Otherwise Caused, 42
A.L.R.3d 560 (1972). But the Larsen view soon began to predominate, and the Seventh
Circuit changed its view, repudiating Evans. See Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213
(7th Cir. 1974). Clearly, the Larsen view has prevailed. See generally Michael Hoenig &
Cecilia H. Goetz, A Rational Approach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles: The Need for Judi-
cial Responsibility, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 1, 41-44 (1974) (suggesting that many courts rejected
Larsen because of speculative nature of crash design cases); Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page,
Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CAL. L. REV. 645 (1967) (advocating judi-
cial action in defect design cases to command higher standards for greater public safety);
Harvey M. Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability: The Need for Uniformity, 4 SroN HALL L.
REV. 499 (1973) (arguing need for consistency among jurisdictions in motor vehicle products
liability cases).
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both of which are sequential models, are opposites: in the last clear
chance model, the first mover has an advantage because it can put
the second mover in a position where the second mover must take
the last clear chance to minimize expected social cost; in the fore-
seeable negligence model, the first mover is at a disadvantage be-
cause it can reasonably foresee misuse or carelessness by the sec-
ond mover and should take care against foreseeable harm to
minimize expected social cost.
The foreseeable negligence model is one which assumes uncer-
tain knowledge and sequential action. These assumptions dictate
that the model should contain the possibility of both alternative
care and joint care solutions. With respect to the alternative care
solutions, the first mover, who is the high cost-avoider, is at a dis-
advantage in this model because it can reasonably foresee misuse'92
or negligence by the second mover and so has a duty to take care
in order to minimize expected social cost.
If the first mover is the least cost-avoider, the model is trivial.
For example, if it is foreseeable that a cheap metal guard on a ma-
chine will prevent many injuries to many workers over many years,
failure to install such a guard would clearly support a finding that
such machine was defectively designed; it is well settled that a
manufacturer, as first mover and least cost-avoider, is liable for
192 See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 484 A.2d 1234, 1241 (N.J. 1984) (sufficient
evidence to demonstrate objective foreseeability of removal of heater's safety control mecha-
nism and misuse of the product).
The concept of a defect-free and properly-designed product extends to one that is
suitably safe after it has been either foreseeably altered or foreseeably
misused ....
It is plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that it was objectively foreseeable that the
subsequent substantial alteration or misuse of the product would create the risk of
his injury.
Id. (emphasis added); see also DeSantis v. Parker Feeders, Inc., 547 F.2d 357, 360-63 (1976)
(child caught in whirling blades and injured while climbing over trough and auger of cattle
feeder; held irrelevant that boy and brothers activated feeder with pitchfork to play games
because feeder's blades were not covered by guard); Decorative Precast Stone Erectors, Inc.
v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 493 F. Supp. 555, 557-58 (W.D. Penn. 1980) (buyer could recover even
if both defect and misuse found to be proximate causes), af'd, 642 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1981);
Rivera v. Westinghouse Elevator Co., 526 A.2d 705 (N.J. 1987) (failure to allocate any de-
gree of fault to decedent in elevator accident was against weight of evidence, but availability
of defense of contributory negligence did not turn on whether elevator was used for its in-
tended purpose); Soler v. Castmaster, 484 A.2d 1225, 233-34 (N.J. 1984) (jury question
whether machine was defective and whether alteration of machine "substantially" increased
risk of accidental injury); POSNER, supra note 1, at 167.
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such injuries. 193 Thus, the interesting cases are those where the
first mover, as the high cost-avoider, reasonably foresees that the
second mover, as the least cost-avoider, will be negligent.
A joint care solution is also possible in this model if the
probability of foreseeable misuse or negligence by the second
mover can be significantly reduced by a warning from the first
mover. The joint care, or cooperative, solution significantly reduces
the first mover disadvantage inherent in the model by allowing the
first mover to shift a significant portion of the burden of care for-
ward to the second mover. Whether the least cost solution is an
alternative care or a joint care solution depends upon the relative
values of the variables, B, P, and L.
Assume damage of $1000 can be avoided by two alternative
care methods or one joint care method: damage can be avoided by
the first mover, who is the high cost-avoider, at a cost of $100, by
the second mover, who is the least cost-avoider, at a cost of $50,
and by joint care, which costs the first mover $30 to warn the sec-
ond mover to take care, after which the second mover's cost of care
is $40. It is clear that if legal certainty were assumed, the least cost
solution would be the alternative care solution in which the second
mover takes care at a cost of $50. Assuming uncertainty and se-
quential action, the solution that will minimize social cost depends
upon the probability that the first mover will reasonably foresee
negligence by the second mover. If the probability of reasonably
foreseeable misuse or negligence is low, the standard economic
model, which places the entire liability on the least cost-avoider
(second mover), is the relevant model.194
In Figure 4 (p. 56), the expected social cost of each possible
outcome is given at the right of each branch of the decision tree.195
193 In Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), a power tool that
could be used as a saw, drill, or wood lathe was found to be defectively designed. Screws
used to hold parts of the machine together were set inadequately so that normal vibration
caused the tailstock of the lathe to move away from the piece of wood being turned, permit-
ting it to fly out of the lathe. Id. at 899. In Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033
(Or. 1974), a sanding machine for fiberboard did not hold its grip on a thin piece of fiber-
board but suddenly expelled it, injuring the plaintiff. Id. at 1034. The sanding machine was
found to be defectively designed because it lacked a line of metal teeth that would have
prevented the backward motion at relatively small expense. Id. at 1035.
W4 See, e.g., Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188 (1st. Cir. 1980) (neither manu-
facturer nor brewer liable to 8-year-old injured by shards from bottle he threw against tele-
phone pole).
..5 Branch (1) equals $100 + (0.947)($50) = $147.35; Branch (2) equals $100 + $0 =
$100; Branch (3) equals $30 + (0.947)($40) + (0.053)($1000) = $120.88; Branch (4) equals
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If because of uncertainty the first mover foresees that the second
mover will be careless with a probability greater than 0.053,
whether or not there is a warning, that is, the warning is not effec-
tive, then the alternative care solution (branch (2)) in Figure 4,
where the first mover takes care, is the least cost solution ($100).196
This solution describes Larsen.197 If, however, the probability that
the second mover will erroneously believe it is the high cost-
avoider is greater than 0.053 before the warning but less than 0.03
after the warning, that is, the warning is effective, the joint care
solution (branch (4)), where the first mover warns the second
mover, after which the second mover takes care, is the least cost
solution (less than $100). This solution may describe Levi.19 Ap-
plying the model to Levi, the power company is the first mover and
high cost-avoider, and the plaintiff is the second mover and low
cost-avoider. In Figure 4, the first mover's alternative care solution,
where the power company insulates all overhead wires at consider-
able expense, is represented by branch (2). The second mover's al-
ternative care solution, where the plaintiff avoids the accident by
carefully scrutinizing the site and perhaps choosing another loca-
tion for the repair of the rig, is represented by branch (6). If the
probability that the plaintiff will be careless is significant and fore-
seeable, this is not the least cost solution. The joint care solution,
which corresponds to cooperative measures, such as a warning sign
on the power pole and an orange warning ball on the power line
itself combined with greater attentiveness on the plaintiff's part, is
represented by branch (3) or (4), depending upon whether the
warning is effective or not: if the warning is effective, branch (4) is
relevant and represents the least cost solution; if the warning is
ineffective, branch (3) is relevant, and branch (2), where the power
company insulates electric wires, is the least cost solution.
$30 + (0.96875)($40) + (0.03125)($1000) = 100; Branch (5) equals $30 + $1000 = $1030;
Branch (6) equals $0 + (0.0526315)($1000) + (0.9473685)($50) = $100; Branch (7) $0 + $0
+ $1000 = $1000.
1"6 See supra note 195 (determining social cost of branch (2)); see also Colter v. Barber-
Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1314 (Mass. 1988) (applying unreasonable use doctrine to
product liability actions sounding in negligence foreclosed by Massachusetts' comparative
negligence statute that provides that plaintiffs contributory negligence, if less than amount
attributable to defendant(s), will proportionately reduce recovery, not bar it).
107 See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
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If the power company had no duty to foresee carelessness by
the plaintiff, that is, in a world where everyone is presumed to act
with due care, the plaintiff would be the least cost-avoider, and the
power company would not be liable for his injuries. However, in a
world in which the reasonably prudent person is required to realize
that there is some negligence in the world, the power company, to
minimize expected social cost, should either have insulated the
overhead wire or warned of the danger. The Court in Levi held
that the power company was negligent because it neither insulated
the overhead wire nor warned of the danger. 199
It is easy to see that the contributory negligence defense, in
the context of the foreseeable negligence model, is not as efficient
as comparative negligence. Under the contributory negligence de-
fense, the plaintiff, who was the least cost-avoider, would be negli-
gent and would bear the entire loss. But, because negligence in the
foreseeable negligence model is defined as the failure to take action
that minimizes expected social cost, given the reasonably foresee-
able level of precaution or lack thereof taken by other persons, the
defendant was also negligent for not having at least warned the
plaintiff. Only a comparative negligence standard, which shares
losses according to relative fault, would provide the defendant with
an efficient incentive at least to warn the plaintiff in the future.
Since Louisiana is a comparative negligence state, the plaintiff was
entitled to some of his damages rather than none.200
In Larsen, the manufacturer is the first mover and high cost-
avoider and the plaintiff is the second mover and least cost-avoider
because it is clearly less expensive for the plaintiff to drive with
reasonable care than for the manufacturer to spend several thou-
sand dollars per car in an effort to design automobiles to be crash-
worthy. However, it is also clear that automobile accidents would
not be prevented if manufacturers merely issued a warning that
automobiles are not crashworthy because such warning would not
be likely to alter driving habits. In a world in which the reasonably
prudent person is required to realize that some persons are negli-
gent, an automobile manufacturer, although high cost-avoider, is,
because of its first mover status, required to design cars that are
crashworthy; that is, branch (2) of the model in Figure 4 is likely to
199 Levi, 542 So. 2d at 1088. The power company also could have routed the line differ-
ently, raised it to a safer level, temporarily insulted the line, or installed it underground. Id.
20 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991).
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be the least cost solution. In this case, efficient loss-sharing can be
achieved if the manufacturer is "liable for that portion of the dam-
age or injury caused by the defective design over and above the
damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of
the impact or collision absent the defective design." 201
B. Foreseeable Negligence Model and Cost-Benefit Quan-
tification
In Grimshaw v. Ford Mot'or Co.,20 2 the plaintiffs were traveling
on an interstate freeway in a Pinto hatchback when the carburetor
failed, causing the car to stall in the middle lane and to be hit.2 3
The colliding car had applied its brakes and was traveling between
28 and 37 miles per hour at the moment of collision.20 4 The impact
of the collision drove the Pinto's gas tank forward, causing it to
rupture and spill fuel into the passenger compartment.20 5 Both the
driver and passenger were engulfed in flames and sustained severe
burns, from which the driver died.20 6 The defendant-manufacturer
was aware that the preferred placement for the gas tank in Europe
and Japan was above rather than behind the rear axle as in the
Pinto, that the Pinto had less "crush space" than any other Ameri-
can automobile of the period, that the rear "bumper was little
more than a chrome strip, less substantial than the bumper of any
other American car produced then or later," and that its rear
structure lacked reinforcing members.207 The jury found for the
plaintiffs and awarded slightly more than $3.5 million in compen-
satory damages and $125 million in punitive damages; all but $3.5
million of the punitive damages were remitted.0
Grimshaw has attracted a great deal of comment209 because
20' Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503.
202 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
20' Id. at 359.
204 Id. A number of tort actions have been brought against Ford for death or injury
resulting from the explosion of the Pinto's fuel tank in low velocity collisions. POSNER, supra
note 68, at 225-26.
20" Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 360.
200 Id. at 358.
201 See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 404-07; POSNER, supra note 68, at 225-26;
Richard Epstein, Is Pinto a Criminal?, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 15; David G. Owen,
Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49
U. CH. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1982); Roy J. Harris, Why Pinto Jury Felt Ford Deserved $125
Million Penalty, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1978, at Al; Ford Ignored Pinto Fire Peril, Secret
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defendant's in-house cost-benefit studies concluded that it was not
cost-efficient to redesign or reposition the gas tank in its Pinto au-
tomobile, or to reinforce the Pinto's rear structure to make it more
crashworthy.210 The defendant did not use the Hand test in its
cost-benefit studies, possibly because it may have believed that the
probability that an accident would occur, the P variable in the
Hand formula, was unquantifiable. 21' The conclusion from one of
defendant's cost-benefit studies was that total benefits of $49.5
million from preventing an estimated 180 serious burn injuries, 180
burn deaths, and 2,100 destroyed vehicles would be significantly
less than the total dollar costs of $137 million required to
strengthen or reposition the Pinto's fuel tank on the estimated 11
million cars and 1.5 million trucks that would be sold.21 2
Three estimates used in the study invite discussion: (1) the
estimate of the number of serious burn injuries, deaths, and
burned vehicles; (2) the estimate of the value of a life, and (3) the
estimate of the cost to redesign or reinforce a gas tank. The esti-
mate of the number of serious burns, deaths, and burned vehicles
appears to be reasonable when one considers that 500 to 1000 per-
sons die from traffic accident fires in this nation each year,213 and
that the Pinto fire fatality rate was apparently within the norm for
subcompacts.21 4 The defendant claimed that the $200,000 figure as-
Memos Show, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1979, at 1.
210 Ford denied that its decision to neither redesign, reinforce, nor restructure was
based on the cost-benefit studies. Ford claimed that it had been required by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration to make the analysis. POSNER, supra note 68, at 226.
"' Recall Section II's discussion of Helling v. Carey, supra notes 137-49, concerning
the difficulty of quantifying the variables in the Hand test. It was also shown that uncer-
tainty about the variables of the Hand test could mask cause-in-fact problems; in Grim-
shaw, it is possible that a Pinto would have exploded after a rear-end collision even if not
defectivery designed.
212 See POSNER, supra note 68, at 225. One of the studies is summarized in the following
table:
Benefits
Savings-180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2,100 burned vehicles
Unit Cost- $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, $700 per vehicle
Total Benefit- 180 x ($200,000) + 180 x ($67,000) + 2100 x ($700) = $49.5
million
Costs
Sales- 11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks
Unit Cost- $11 per car, $11 per truck
Total Cost- 11,000,000 x ($11) + 1,500,000 x ($11) = $137 million
Id.; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 406.
21 Owen, supra note 209, at 30-31 n.138.
214 See id. (citing defendant's Exhibit EE, in State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Super.
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signed to the value of a life was supplied by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.215 In terms of 1978 dollars, esti-
mates of the value of a life varied from $170,000 to $3,000,000.218
In 1983, W. Kip Viscusi, a leading expert, recommended that for
policy purposes a life should be valued at $2 million.217 (Estimates
in 1990 dollars are between a low of $2 million and high of $6 mil-
lion per life.2 18). Had the defendants used a life estimate value of
$700,000 or more in its study, total benefits from redesign or repo-
sitioning the gas tank would have outweighed the costs; 219 redesign
would have been cost-justified.
A central question is whether the cost of $11 per vehicle for
redesign or reinforcement of the gas tank was the proper amount
to use in defendant's cost-benefit analysis (or as the burden, B, in
the Hand test). One can argue that many hundreds of design
choices are made by engineers in the production of a single com-
plex product-one more cross beam can always be added here,
strengthened there, made of another stronger material, and so
forth-that each such decision involves a range of trade-offs be-
tween cost, weight, appearance, performance capabilities, and
safety, and that "although much of this decision making involves
the application of proven scientific principles, much is art, and
some by its nature can be little more than trial and error. '220
Therefore, one can conclude that engineering decisions should not
Ct. Elkhart City, Ind., Sept. 13, 1978)). This exhibit set forth National Highway Transporta-
tion Safety Administration's Fatal Accident Reporting System data for post-1970 cars in
fatal fire accidents, per million cars in operation, for 1975 and 1976: all vehicles-6.8; all
compacts-7.3; Pinto-7.0; VW-9.3; Vega-7.0; Datsun-9.7; Toyota-4.9; Gremlin-9.8;
Dodge Colt-5.3; Opel-8.8; Honda-11.1. Id.
21 POSNER, supra note 68, at 226.
218 See DOUGLAS GREER, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY 414-15 (2d ed. 1987). The
basic calculation is as follows: If statistical estimates reveal an annual wage premium of $500
for each added death per annum per thousand workers, then 1,000 workers must be paid
$500 each for accepting the risk of that one death. 1,000 X $500 = $500,000, the value of
that "statistical" life. W. Kip Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 26-30 (1984).
21" W. Kip VIscusI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORK-
PLACE 106 (1983). "For the purposes of policy evaluation .... estimates of $500,000 seem
most reasonable for workers in high-risk jobs (about 1/1000 annually). For workers facing
less severe risks (about 1/10,000 annually), an estimate of $2,000,000 appears more reasona-
ble." Id.
218 Viscusi, supra note 38, at 78.
219 Savings-180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2,100 burned vehicles;
Unit Cost-$700,O00 per death, $67,000 per injury, $700 per vehicle;
Total Benefit- 180 x ($700,000) + 180 x ($67,000) + 2100 x ($700) = $139.5 mil-
lion, which exceeds $137 million in costs.
220 Owen, supra note 209, at 24-25.
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be judged entirely by hindsight, which is perfect.221 On the other
hand, one can argue that if the defendant had designed the Pinto
properly in the first place, relying on common knowledge and in-
dustry custom, it could have shielded the fuel tank at no extra cost
simply by placing the tank above the rear axle or farther forward
in the chassis.222 Moreover, should not the public be entitled to
believe that the Pinto's fuel tank was as safe as that of other
automobiles of its size and price?22 Given the latter position, the
benefits of redesign would clearly outweigh the costs, which in a
social sense would be zero. If one were to employ the standard eco-
nomic model of negligence with its assumption of legal certainty,
the cost of redesign would be zero, since the defendant would be
held to know all relevant costs and legal standards.
V. LIABILITY FOR MISMANUFACTURED PRODUCTS DISTINGUISHED
FROM LIABILITY FOR DESIGN DEFECTS AND DEFECTIVE WARNINGS
In this section, we begin by considering Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc.,224 a mismanufactured product case. Next, mis-
manufactured products are distinguished from design defects and
defective warnings in three ways: by definition, economic theory,
and appropriate liability rules. The effect of a shift from a negli-
gence standard to strict liability is analyzed in terms of three
problems of asymmetric information,225 which concern burden of
proof, insurance, and activity effect.226 A major conclusion is that
manufacturers should be strictly liable for mismanufactured prod-
ucts, but that in design defect and defective warning cases, courts
should, in general, be wary of extending liability much beyond a
negligence standard. Major contributions to the economic analysis
of the effect of a shift in the basis of liability from a negligence
221 See James A. Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Product Liability, 69
CAL. L. REV. 919, 921-24 (1981).
222 Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
223 POSNER, supra note 68, at 226.
224 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
225 POSNER, supra note 1, at 166. "In a game of asymmetric information, player Smith
knows something that player Brown does not." RASMUSEN, supra note 5, at 133. Rasmusen
divides asymmetric information into the categories of moral hazard, adverse selection, sig-
naling, and screening. Id.; see also TIROLE, supra note 8, at 362-64.
22 These three effects are sometimes collectively called enterprise liability. See Hen-
derson, Enterprise Liability, supra note 13, at 659; George L. Priest, The Invention of En-
terprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
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standard to strict liability were made by Dean Calabresi 227 and
Steven Shavell. 228
In Henningsen, the plaintiff was badly injured when some-
thing went wrong with the steering mechanism of the automobile
she was driving, causing the car to turn sharply to the right and to
crash into a wall. 229 The plaintiff's husband had bought the car as
a present for her from a retail dealer who had bought it from the
manufacturer; the contract of sale effectively disclaimed all war-
ranties.23 0 The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the dis-
claimer was contrary to public policy and therefore void.23' More-
over, the court said that a warranty of merchantability is implied
by law and is chargeable to either the manufacturer or dealer and
extends to anyone operating the car with the owner's consent.232
A. Mismanufactured Products Distinguished from Design De-
fects and Defective Warnings
In general, a mismanufactured product is a unit of output
which differs from all other units a manufacturer produces by the
same process, as, for example, in Henningsen, where an automo-
bile's defective steering mechanism caused it to crash, rendering it
different from other steering mechanisms produced by the same
manufacturing process that did not cause crashes. In a design de-
fect case, however, the issue is whether all products manufactured
by the same process subject consumers to unreasonable risks, like
the automobiles involved in the Larsen and Grimshaw cases.233
In terms of economic theory, mismanufactured product cases
are distinguished from design defect and defective warning cases in
terms of their respective Cost of Accident Damage curves, which
are depicted in Figures 5a and 5b (p. 64). The essential distinction
is that in mismanufactured products cases, the total amount of
227 See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 57, at 1055.
228 See Shavell, supra note 42, at 1. For an analysis of the activity effect elegant in its
simplicity, see POSNER, supra note 1, at 160-67.
229 Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 73-75.
2. Id. at 73-74, 78-79.
21 Id. at 95.
232 Id. at 100.
2' See Aaron D. Twerski & Alvin S. Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product
Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 22 (1978-79) (analyzing many
problems implicit in distinguishing between manufacturing and design defects for purpose
of imposing liability).
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damage under the Cost of Accident Damage curve is bounded,234
whereas in design defect and defective warning cases, the total
amount of damage under the Cost of Accident Damage curve is
potentially unbounded. With respect to mismanufactured prod-
ucts, as the level of care employed in a manufacturing process is
increased through a quality control program, the cost of accident
damage from a mismanufactured product can not only be reduced,
it can be reduced arbitrarily close to zero. As is clear from Figure
5a, near perfect quality control is attainable at a level of precau-
tion equal to C. On the other hand, with respect to the safety as-
pects of product design, the possibility of increased safety is al-
most limitless. As pointed out in the discussion of Grimshaw, the
Pinto gas-tank case, a product can always be made safer by using
stronger or thicker materials, by being strengthened through the
addition of cross beams or through the addition of safety features.
Since products can always be designed in a safer manner, it is clear
from Figure 5b that the area under the Cost of Accident Damage
curve is potentially limitless, that is, unbounded. 2 " The same rea-
soning applies to product warnings, which can also be virtually in-
creased to a limitless extent.3 6
B. Asymmetric Information and the Burden of Proof
If products were governed by a negligence standard where the
plaintiff has the burden of proof, manufacturers would have an un-
fair advantage in litigation because consumers, as plaintiffs, would
have the burden of proving that a product was negligently manu-
factured even though manufacturers have exclusive access to and
control over information necessary for such proof 23 7 In terms of
23 Even if the Cost of Accident Damage curve is asymptotic, that is, approaches ever
closer to but never touches the horizontal axis so that the curve itself is not bounded, the
total amount of damage under the curve will be bounded, that is, the total amount of dam-
age will be less than some determinable upper bound.
Figure 5b is Figure 1 minus the Sum of Social Costs curve.
236 Courts have held that manufacturers need not warn against obvious hazards. See,
e.g., Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.) (seller of a forklift platform that had
no guard was not required to warn that large cartons might fall off it), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
940 (1969); Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co., 174 N.W.2d 752 (Mich. 1970) (manufacturer of wire
mesh milk container does not have to warn that bottles will break if container is dropped on
sidewalk).
237 It is not clear whether costs of administering the judicial system would be more or
less after a shift in the basis of liability from negligence to strict liability. The trial of a
strict liability case is simpler than a negligence case because there is one less issue, negli-
gence. However, the potential saving in information costs may be offset by a greater number
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economic theory, manufacturers are said to have an advantage over
consumers because of asymmetric information. Thus, as is well
known, one rationale for the shift from a negligence standard to
strict liability in products liability cases is to eliminate the burden
of proof problem that victims would encounter in a negligence suit
by expanding the circumstantial evidence doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur ss to encompass all mismanufactured products.2"9
If products liability law merely shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant on the issue of negligence, then such shift would
have no effect on the level of safety. This conclusion is easily
demonstrated by looking at Figures 5a and 5b. If products liability
were governed by a negligence standard, and a manufacturer
adopted the efficient level of care, E, it would not be liable for the
cost of accident damage from mismanufactured products repre-
sented by the triangle-like area EFC in Figure 5a, nor the cost of
accident damage from defectively designed products or defective
warnings represented by trapezoid-like area EFCN, which damage
could only be eliminated in either case by a level of precaution
greater than the efficient level E. If there were a shift from a negli-
of claims, which has a potential for greater total costs. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 164.
28 Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944); Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299
(Ex. 1863); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 39-40, at 242-62.
23' "Strictly speaking, since negligence is not in question, res ipsa loquitur has no appli-
cation to a strict liability case. But the inferences that are the core of the doctrine are not
less applicable to strict liability." WILLIAM PROSSER ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 764
(8th ed. 1988); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110
N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1961); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Fried-
man v. General Motors Corp., 331 N.E.2d 702 (Ohio 1975).
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gence standard to one of strict liability, manufacturers would be
liable for the damage represented by area EFC in Figure 5a and
the area EFCN in Figure 5b, but they would not increase the level
of precaution to eliminate such accident damage because the cost
of eliminating such damage as represented in either Figure 5a or
5b by trapezoid-like area EFRC would greatly exceed the damage
for which they would be liable. In other words, it would be less
expensive for manufacturers to pay for infrequent damage when it
occurs than to pay to eliminate such damage, so manufacturers
would not take greater care than the efficient level E.
C. Strict Liability and Insurance
The kind of product failures against which manufacturers ex-
pressly warrant their products, mostly due to defects in operation,
are frequent and hence familiar to consumers and therefore enter
into their buying decisions. However, because consumers generally
have little information concerning the probability that they will
sustain serious personal injuries because of mismanufactured prod-
ucts, they cannot evaluate accurately the need for insurance
against such product failures.240 On the other hand, manufacturers
are usually well apprised of the safety record of their products
through reports, complaints, demands for replacements, and prod-
uct liability suits. As a result of this second information, asymme-
try that disfavors consumers, manufacturers are, in general, the
least cost insurers of mismanufactured and defectively designed
products.
1. Mismanufactured Products and Insurance
Consider the effect on insurance markets of a shift from negli-
gence to strict liability in mismanufactured product cases. In terms
of Figure 5a, under a negligence standard, consumers would either
have to buy first-party insurance to cover damage equal to trian-
gle-like area EFC for which they are not compensated or accept
the risk of such damage. Under a negligence standard, accident
costs that are unavoidable by due care are borne by consumers and
240 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 166. If the injury is common and consumer informa-
tion better, the defense of assumption of risk will bar the injured consumer from obtaining
damages. Id.; see also Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (hold-
ing cigarettes to be inherently unsafe product), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
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other strangers to the industry (hence, external241 to the industry).
Consumers pay slightly lower prices for products and can decide
whether to buy personal insurance for injuries that occur without
manufacturer fault or to accept a slightly higher risk of injury
without compensation.
Under strict liability, however, manufacturers have to buy in-
surance or self insure for damage equal to area EFC. Here, the
product price includes a small premium for insurance against per-
sonal injuries that result from mismanufactured products; consum-
ers pay slightly higher prices for products and a slightly lower
price for personal insurance coverage. Thus, under strict liability,
consumers must buy both product and insurance even if they
would rather pay a slightly lower price for the product and accept
a slightly higher risk of injury without compensation. Assuming all
consumers would prefer to buy a product plus insurance against
accident damage from mismanufacture, to the extent that manu-
facturers are the least cost insurers against accidents from mis-
manufactured products because they can use their superior infor-
mation concerning safety risks, either to self insure or to buy
insurance at less cost than consumers can buy such insurance, total
insurance costs should be lower under strict liability.
2. Design Defects and Defective Warnings: From Negligence to
Strict Liability to Absolute Liability
Consider the effect on insurance markets of a shift from negli-
gence to strict liability in design defect and defective warning
cases. In terms of Figure 5b (p. 64), under a negligence standard,
consumers would either have to buy first party insurance to cover
accident damage equal to the open-ended area EFCN for which
they are not compensated or to accept the risk of such damage.
Since EFCN is unbounded and therefore potentially limitless,
complete insurance for all such accident damage would, if available
at all, be extremely costly. It is highly unlikely that consumers
would be willing or able to insure completely against all such acci-
dent damage. If the standard of liability in products design and
products warnings cases is shifted from negligence to strict liabil-
ity, manufacturers must either buy insurance or self insure for
241 See DONALD DEWEY, MICROECONOMICS 221 (1975) ("an externality exists when some
activity of party A imposes a cost or confers a benefit on party B for which party A is not
charged or compensated by (through) the price system."); POSNER, supra note 1, at 162.
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damage equal to the open-ended area EFCN. As pointed out, in-
surance for such potentially limitless damage, even if available,
would be extremely expensive.242 Thus, if manufacturers are
strictly liable in design defect and defective warning cases, con-
sumers will in effect be compelled to buy more insurance than they
would be willing or able to buy.
D. Strict Liability and the Activity Effect
Under a negligence standard, consumers often cannot make
informed choices among products and brands because of asymmet-
ric information that favors manufacturers concerning knowledge of
injuries from mismanufactured products. If consumers are not well
informed, the marketplace may not discipline manufacturers by
failing to divert consumers to safer products and brands.243 How-
ever, when the standard is shifted from negligence to strict liabil-
ity, a higher risk of injury requires a higher insurance premium to
cover such risk. Manufacturers consider that such insurance pre-
miums are a cost of doing business, which, like any other cost,
must be passed on to consumers if the business is to continue oper-
ating without a loss. Strict liability in effect incorporates informa-
tion about a product's hazards into its price; the price of hazardous
products will rise relative to the price of safe products, causing a
substitution away from hazardous products and brands by con-
sumers, even if they are completely unaware of such hazards. The
substitution away from more hazardous products, brands, and ac-
tivities that is caused by strict liability is known as the activity
effect.24 4 Strict liability will cause products24" and brands246 with
242 See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1521-22 (1987) (analyzing relationship between large increase in insurance premi-
ums during middle 1980s and expansion of corporate tort liability); see also Ralph K. Win-
ter, The Liability Insurance Market, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 115-17 (1991).
24 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 162.
24 See Shavell, supra note 42, at 24.
215 As a result of the shift in the basis of liability from $
a negligence standard to strict liability,.the cost of insuring Ds2
against serious injury from mismanufactured products be-
comes an added cost of doing business at all levels of out- S,
put for all sellers of the product in an industry; therefore,
the industry supply curve is shifted upward and to the left.
The equilibrium of industry supply and demand now oc-
curs at a higher price and lower quantity. The reduction in
quantity of output that results from shifting to a standard
of strict liability from one of negligence is the activity ef- E2 E1 Quantity
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poorer safety records to have lower output. Thus, strict liability
reduces accident costs by inducing changes in activity level.
1. Mismanufactured Products and the Activity Effect
If there is a shift from a negligence standard to strict liability,
producers of mismanufactured products will be responsible for
area EFC in Figure 5a (p. 64), which represents the cost of acci-
dent damage from nonnegligently mismanufactured products. Be-
cause of the activity effect, a shift from a negligence standard to
strict liability will cause a rise in the price of products and a reduc-
tion in output below that which would occur under a negligence
standard. However, since the area EFC is bounded and probably
relatively small in relation to the total cost of production, the ac-
tivity effect from a shift from negligence to strict liability for mis-
manufactured products is probably small or negligible.
This analysis tends to explain the law's refusal to enforce dis-
claimers of liability for personal injuries caused by mismanufac-
tured products like that in Henningsen. If the hazard is very small,
it will not pay the consumer to be attentive to disclaimers; and, for
the same reason, the manufacturer will not reap significant ill-will
when it enforces the disclaimer in those very few cases in which
someone is injured. 47 Moreover, this analysis suggests that the ac-
fect (from El to E2 above). The strength of the activity effect depends upon the elasticity of
demand (the responsiveness of the quantity bought to a change in price and the extent of
the vertical shift in the supply curve (from S1 to S2)) which in turn depends on the
probability the product will be mismanufactured and the damage caused from such mis-
manufacture. See MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 35-37, 121-26.
246 In a competitive industry, all sellers are "price takers." PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WIL-
LIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONoMics 541 (13th ed. 1989). They take the competitive price as given
(for example, individual farmers have no control over price), therefore the demand curve for
a single seller in a competitive industry is horizontal as in
the figure below. MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 252-55. If
one seller produces a "brand name" product that has a $
poorer safety record than brands of other manufacturers in
the same industry, its supply curve will shift upward and
to the left (S1 to S) because of the higher risk premiums it 2
pays for insurance. However, unlike the case in which the S,
costs of insurance rises for all manufacturers in an indus- d
try, when one manufacturer has a poorer safety record
than other manufacturers in a competitive industry, it can-
not pass along any of the higher risk premium to consum-
ers; therefore a substantial activity effect is likely to occur
so that quantity sold is reduced (from El to E2), because of E2  El Quantity
reduced profitability.
247 POSNER, supra note 1, at 166. If consumers differ in their ability to cope with prod-
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tivity effect, the rise in price and reduction in output consequent
upon such liability, is small.
2. Design Defects, Defective Warnings, and the Activity Effect
If there is a shift from a negligence standard to strict liability
in design defects and defective warning cases, manufacturers will
be responsible for the open-ended area EFCN in Figure 5b, which
represents the cost of accident damage from nonnegligently
designed products for which additional safety or warnings are not
justified by cost-benefit analysis. Since the area EFCN is un-
bounded and probably relatively large in relation to the total cost
of production, the activity effect of a shift from negligence to strict
liability in design defect and defective warning cases may be very
substantial. In some cases, a shift to strict liability may cause the
price of many nonnegligently designed products to rise so much
that manufacturers may cease producing them.24 s In these cases,
the activity effect is such that there may be no price at which man-
ufacturers can profitably produce and sell such products. If manu-
facturers are strictly liable in design defect and defective warning
cases, courts may drive many products off the market. Thus, in
design defect and defective warning cases, if liability is extended
beyond negligence, there is no logical stopping place; therefore
strict liability can easily become absolute liability: unlike mis-
manufactured products liability, where a shift from negligence to
strict liability involves the shifting and spreading of small, known
risks, whose costs are bounded, a shift from negligence to strict
liability in design defect and defective warnings cases involves po-
tentially unbounded liability and therefore can become limitless
absolute liability. Those courts which hold that "strict" liability in
design defect and defective warning cases should be circumscribed
by risk-utility or cost-benefit tests that sound in negligence24 rec-
ognize that strict liability may mean potentially unlimited liability,
whereas those courts that adhere to the semantic distinction be-
tween negligence, which focuses on a manufacturer's conduct, and
strict liability, which focuses on the product, appear to be unaware
uct hazards a disclaimer of liability could be a good way of sorting consumers according to
that ability. Id. at 166-67.
248 See Priest, supra note 242, at 1522-23; Winter, supra note 242, at 115-17.
249 Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185-86 (Mich. 1984) (design defect case);
Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 273 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Mich. 1979) (defective warning case).
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of the problem. 25 1 Thus, in design defect and defective warning
cases, courts should, in general, be wary of extending liability
much beyond a negligence standard.25'
CONCLUSION
This Article attempted to resolve two related disputes between
lawyers and economists that arise under the law of torts. One dis-
pute concerns the definition of due care: economists contend that
the reasonably prudent person is justified in assuming other per-
sons always use due care; lawyers argue that the reasonably pru-
dent person knows or should know that others act negligently
sometimes. A second dispute concerns whether the several negli-
gence rules are equally efficient: economists contend that the con-
tributory negligence defense, which bars tort recovery by negligent
plaintiffs, is just as efficient as comparative negligence, which
shares losses according to relative fault; lawyers argue that com-
parative negligence is the preferred legal standard.
By restating the economic model of negligence in the context
of a simple information theory framework, the general correctness
of the lawyers' position in both disputes was easily demonstrated.
We asked whether persons and courts have certain knowledge of
all relevant facts and legal standards, or, is there legal certainty or
uncertainty, and whether all persons act simultaneously or sequen-
tially. Because each of these two variables has two choices, four
models result: assuming legal certainty and simultaneous action by
all persons yields the standard economic model of negligence; as-
suming legal certainty and sequential action results in the last
clear chance model; assuming uncertainty and simultaneous action
gives us the defensive care model; assuming uncertainty and se-
quential action yields the foreseeable negligence model. With the
exception of the first, or standard economic model, it was shown
that the reasonably prudent person knows or should know that
others act negligently sometimes and that the comparative negli-
gence standard is more efficient than the contributory negligence
defense.
... Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 454-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (approving
this distinction); Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 184 (disapproving this distinction).
"' As a rationale for extending liability in a defective warnings case beyond that which
would be justified by the cost-benefit standard inherent in a negligence standard, the D.C.
Circuit has said that state tort law may have broader compensatory goals. Ferebee v. Chev-
ron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1540 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
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These models are not only relevant to negligence suits, they
also explain products liability suits based upon design defect or
defective warning claims because these claims are de facto negli-
gence suits. In terms of economic theory, design defect and defec-
tive warning cases are distinguished from mismanufactured prod-
uct cases by their respective accident damage costs. The essential
distinction is that in mismanufactured product cases, the total
amount of nonnegligent accident damage is bounded and relatively
small in comparison to production costs, whereas in design defect
and defective warning cases, the total amount of nonnegligent acci-
dent damage is unbounded and potentially limitless. A major con-
clusion is that manufacturers should be strictly liable for mis-
manufactured products, but that in design defect and defective
warning cases, courts should, in general, be wary of extending lia-
bility much beyond a negligence standard.

